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INTRODUCTION 
In the well-known fairy tale of rags to riches, a poor 
hardworking girl is transformed into a princess with the help of 
her fairy godmother and her magic wand. In the European 
enlargement version of this fairy tale, the girl is the Western 
Balkan countries, the fairy godmother is the European 
Commission, and the magic wand is the Copenhagen criteria 
and the policy of conditionality. Unlike the head-to-toe princess 
transformation that takes a simple tap of the fairy godmother’s 
wand, the accession process for Western Balkan countries 
consists of a drawn-out, do-it-yourself reform process that only 
leads to piecemeal transformation. 
On July 1, 2013, Croatia became the twenty-eighth member 
of the European Union, a process that took a decade to 
complete. 1  Amidst celebration, however, the message that 
rippled through Western Balkan nations was two-fold and 
contradictory: (1) the European Union continues to be 
committed to the region, and Western Balkan countries can 
work to mirror Croatia’s success, but (2) the European Union is 

1 . See Croatia Celebrates on Joining EU, BBC NEWS (July 1, 2013), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23118035 (reporting that after ten years since its 
application for membership, Croatia became the twenty-eigth Member of the European 
Union); see also Honor Mahony, Croatia Becomes 28th EU Member State, EU OBSERVER 
(July 1, 2013, 9:03 AM), http://euobserver.com/enlargement/120688 (noting that 
Croatia became a Member of the European Union a decade after starting the accession 
process). 
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developing “enlargement fatigue” from the accession of new 
countries and is wary of further expansion.2 
Conscious of the fact that countries lose the initiative to 
continue the necessary reforms once they become members, the 
European Union has made the path to accession more 
demanding. 3  In June 2003, the European Council of 
Thessaloniki reiterated its resolve to support the Western Balkan 
countries in their accession to the European Union. 4  The 
Council clarified that the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements (“SAAs”), outlining the new conditions necessary 
for membership under the Stabilization and Association Process 
(“SAP”), would serve as the primary contractual agreements 
guiding the membership process. 5  For Western Balkan 

2. See Paula M. Pickering, The Constraints on European Institution’s Conditionality in 
the Western Balkans, 63 EUR. ASIA STUD. 1939, 1941 (2011) (noting that many EU 
Member States are suffering from enlargement fatigue which affects their commitment 
to West Balkan states other than Croatia); Naftali Bendavid, Fule Says the EU Should 
Expand Further, But With Care, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/
brussels/2013/10/16/fule-says-the-eu-should-expand-further-but-with-care/ (discussing 
the progress made by West Balkan countries towards accession and the “enlargement 
fatigue” developed by some of EU leaders); see also EU Enlargement: The Next Seven, BBC 
NEWS (July 1, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11283616 (explaining 
that Croatia’s accession was seen as a strong signal of EU commitment to the region, 
but also citing surveys suggesting widespread enlargement fatigue in Europe). 
3. See John O’Brennan & Esmeralda Gassie, From Stabilization to Consolidation: 
Albanian State Capacity and Adaptation to European Union Rules, 11 J. BALKAN & NEAR E. 
STUD. 61, 61 (2009) (arguing that attitudes regarding enlargement have hardened and 
EU conditionality requires that Western Balkan countries reform prior to 
membership); see also Mahony, supra note 1, para. 6 (noting that the path to joining the 
European Union has become more exacting); Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013–2014, 
COM (2013) 700 final, at 2 (Oct. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Enlargement Strategy 2013–
2014] (acknowledging that the accession process is more rigorous and comprehensive 
than in the past). 
4. See Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European Council (June 19 & 20, 
2003) (reiterating the Council’s determination to fully and effectively support the 
European perspective of the Western Balkan countries once they meet the established 
criteria); see also Florian Trauner, From Membership Conditionality to Policy 
Conditionality: EU External Governance in South-Eastern Europe, Address at the 
European Union Consent Conference 6 (Nov. 16–17, 2007) (stating that at the 
European Council of Thessaloniki, the Council endorsed the Thessaloniki agenda of 
European integration for Western Balkan countries). 
5. See Arolda Elbasani, EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans: Strategies of Borrowing 
and Inventing, 10 J. S. EUR. & BALKANS 293, 302–03 (2008) (discussing the attempt of 
the Thessaloniki Summit to strengthen the association of EU policies in Western 
Balkans and to identify the Stabilization and Association Agreements (“SAAs”) as the 
only contractual agreement for EU membership); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–
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countries, this means a long and challenging climb to EU 
accession with additional membership conditions set out in the 
SAAs that serve as prerequisites to the satisfaction of the 
standard EU membership criteria, known as the Copenhagen 
criteria.6 
Croatia is the first EU acceding country to complete the 
SAP through adherence to the prerequisite requirements of the 
SAA and Copenhagen criteria.7 As such, Croatia may serve as a 
model for other Western Balkan countries in their road to EU 
accession.8 Among these countries is Albania, which formally 
began the EU accession process on June 12, 2006, after signing 
an SAA with the European Union.9 While attempting to emulate 
Croatia as a model for this process, Albania has encountered 
delays, with the SAA and negotiation process taking three years 
to complete.10 Additionally, Albania has not yet been granted 
candidate status for EU membership, which is typically granted 

2014, supra note 3, at 1 (reiterating that at the Thessaloniki Summit the Western 
Balkan countries were granted a clear path to EU membership subject to fulfillment of 
the Copenhagen criteria and Stabilization and Association Process conditions). 
6. Conditions for Membership, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (stating that 
in the case of Western Balkans countries, additional conditions for membership are set 
out in the SAAs); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 1 (affirming 
all Western Balkan countries were granted EU membership subject to fulfillment of 
Copenhagen criteria and the conditions of the Stabilization and Association Process). 
7 . See Dejan Jovic, Croatian EU Membership and the Future of the Balkans, in 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
201, 208 (Vedran Dzihic & Daniel Hamilton ed., 2012) (noting Croatia’s integration 
into the European Union after completing the Stabilization and Association Process 
(“SAP”) process); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 1 (stating 
that Croatia was the first country to complete the SAP). 
8. See Jovic, supra note 7, at 208 (suggesting that Croatia’s successful integration 
into the European Union is likely to encourage other candidates and potential 
candidates); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that 
Croatia serves as an example of the positive effect of the enlargement process). 
9. See Anduena Gjevori, The Rights of Albanian Nationals Under the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement Between Albania and the European Communities, 4 MEDITERRANEAN J. 
SOC. SCI. 439, 440 (2013) (stating that the SAA between Albania and the European 
Union was signed on June 12, 2006); see also Key Dates to Albania’s Path Towards the EU, 
DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO ALBANIA, http://eeas.europa.eu/
delegations/albania/eu_albania/political_relations/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2013) (listing the key dates for Albania’s progress towards becoming an EU Member). 
10 . See EU Enlargement: The Next Seven, supra note 2 (noting that Albania’s 
negotiations for the SAA took three and a half years to complete which was three times 
longer than it took for Croatia); see also Gjevori, supra note 9, at 440 (stating that the 
SAA for Albania entered into force for compliance on April 1, 2009). 
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early on in the accession process.11 It was only recommended for 
candidate status in October 2013, seven years after beginning 
this process.12 
In light of this discussion, Part I of this Comment briefly 
reviews the process of accession to the European Union, 
outlining the key criteria necessary for membership under the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Copenhagen criteria. Part I also 
examines the SAP and the additional conditions imposed by the 
SAAs on Western Balkan countries. Part II analyzes the SAP in 
context through a comparison of the accession processes for 
Croatia and Albania. Part II then assesses the application of the 
prerequisite criteria and the Copenhagen criteria in each case. 
Finally, Part III argues that the willingness to allow Western 
Balkan countries to begin this process is undermined by the lack 
of a defined timeline for the fulfillment of the accession criteria 
and the strict adherence to the conditions of the SAAs as a 
prerequisite to membership. This creates disillusionment with 
this process, as the road to EU accession seems arbitrarily slow 
and laborious for candidate states. Instead, the European Union 
should adhere to a transparent and accountable process, and 
employ the power imbalance created through its policy of 
conditionality to effect the necessary change in the Western 
Balkan countries. 
I. THE CRITERIA FOR EU MEMBERSHIP AND THE PROCESS 
OF ACCESSION FOR WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES 
Part I.A reviews the historical development of the EU 
accession process and the key criteria that must be met by 

11 . See Memorandum from the European Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council 1, MEMO/13/888 (Oct. 16, 2013) (indicating the first 
recommendation made by the Commission that Albania be granted candidate status); 
see also Progres-Raporti i KE Rekomandon: Shqiperise t’i Jepet Statusi. Ja 5 Prioritetet, 
BALKANWEB, Oct. 16, 2013, http://www.balkanweb.com/kryesore/1/ke-publikon-
progres-raportin-2013-rekomandon-shqiperise-ti-jepet-statusi-153849.html (reporting 
that the European Commission finally recommended Albania for candidate status). 
12 . See Memorandum from the European Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, supra note 11 (recommending that Albania be granted EU 
candidate status on condition that it continues its fight against organized crime and 
corruption); see also Progres-Raporti i KE Rekomandon: Shqiperise t’i Jepet Statusi. Ja 5 
Prioritetet, supra note 11 (reporting that Albania was recommended for candidate status 
in the Commission’s 2013 progress report). 
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candidate states for EU membership. Part I.B details the 
accession process for Western Balkan countries in light of the 
SAP framework and the unique characteristics of the Western 
Balkan region. 
A. The Development of the EU Accession Process 
In 1957, six European countries signed the Treaty of Rome, 
establishing the present day European Union. 13  Since its 
inception, the European Union has undergone a number of 
enlargements, the most recent being the accession of Croatia to 
create twenty-eight EU Member States.14 In 1992, the Treaty on 
European Union (“TEU”), known as the Maastricht Treaty, 
established that any European country respecting the core 
principles of the Treaty could apply for EU membership.15 
These core principles include liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.16 
In 1993, recognizing the need for evaluation guidelines, the 
European Council meeting in Copenhagen expanded the 
formal requirements for EU membership, creating the 
Copenhagen criteria.17 This criteria for membership is assessed 
by the European Commission and includes: (1) political 
criteria—stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, 

13. See KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21344, EUROPEAN UNION 
ENLARGEMENT 2 (2013) (reporting that in 1957, six European Coal and Steel 
Community Members, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West 
Germany, signed the Treaty of Rome which became known as the European Union); 
see also Huguette Laermans & Paul Roosens, The Enlargement of the European Union, 18 
EKONOMSKA MISAO PRAKSA 397, 398 (2009) (stating that six countries signed the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957 starting the EEC, now called the European Union). 
14 . See Member Countries of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://
europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) 
(providing a list of current EU Member States totaling 28 Member States following 
Croatia’s accession); see also Archick, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that Croatia’s accession 
brought the Union to 28 Member States). 
15. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 49, 2012 O.J. C 
326/13, at 70 [hereinafter TEU]; see also ARCHICK, supra note 13, at 5 (explaining that 
according to the Maastricht Treaty, any European country could apply for EU 
membership if it met certain political and economic criteria) 
16. TEU, supra note 15, art. 6(1), 2012 O.J. C 326/13, at 19. 
17. See generally European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency 
(Jun. 21–22, 1993), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/
docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf (focusing on the decisions made by the Copenhagen 
European Council regarding the accession process). 
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human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; (2) 
economic criteria—a functioning market economy able to cope 
with the competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union; and (3) legal criteria—a candidate country’s ability to 
undertake the obligations of membership and implement the 
acquis communautaire.18 The acquis communautaire consists of the 
binding body of common rights and obligations applicable to all 
EU Member States that must be acquired by candidate states in 
order to become EU members.19 The lack of clear definitions for 
the material terms of the Copenhagen criteria has been 
criticized as problematic given the potential for its inconsistent 
application. 20  Nevertheless, the ensuing Parts explore the 
general understanding of each criterion that has developed over 
the years through application. 
1. Political Criteria 
The Copenhagen political criteria can be divided into two 
major branches: (1) democracy and the rule of law, and (2) 
human rights and respect and protection of minorities. In 
evaluating the political criteria, the Commission looks primarily 

18. Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council (June 21–22, 1993); 
see Tanja A. Borzel & Thomas Risse, One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of 
Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY, 
AND THE RULE OF LAW, STANFORD UNIVERSITY (Apr. 27, 2005) http://www.eu-
newgov.org/database/PUBLIC/P23000-02-CLU302_One_size_fits_all.pdf (listing the 
three conditions for EU membership established by the Copenhagen European 
Council of 1993). The acquis communautaire consists of the binding body of common 
rights and obligations applicable to all EU Member States that must be acquired by 
candidate states in order to become EU members. 
19 . Presidency Conclusions, Madrid European Council (Dec. 15–16, 1995) 
(noting the added requirement for candidate countries to acquire the acquis 
communautaire before EU membership); see Paulina Rezler, The Copenhagen Criteria: Are 
They Helping or Hurting the European Union, 14 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 390, 392–93 (2011) 
(noting that the Madrid European Council added the acquis requirement to achieve 
uniform legislation throughout the European Union). 
20. See Rezler, supra note 19, at 396 (arguing that the lack of definitions for the 
Copenhagen criteria can lead to inconsistent interpretations of the conditions applied 
to candidate countries); see also Ian Ward, The Culture of Enlargement, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. 
L. 199, 203 (2005) (arguing that the concepts forming the Copenhagen criteria are 
“notoriously vague” and the impression imparted by the criteria is “one of critical 
vagueness”); Tanja Marktler, The Power of the Copenhagen Criteria, 2 CROATIAN Y.B. EUR. 
L. & POL’Y 343, 348 (2006) (noting the difficulty in ascertaining the meaning and 
application of the Copenhagen criteria). 
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at the democracy and the rule of law branch of this inquiry.21 An 
evaluation of democracy and the rule of law encompasses a 
number of factors, including elections, separation of powers 
among the branches of government, and anti-corruption 
measures.22 A country vying for EU membership must undertake 
the necessary measures to ensure free and fair multiparty 
elections and to include opposition parties in parliamentary 
appointments.23 The executive branch of the candidate country 
must also have a unified system of civil service, a decentralized 
and reformed administration, accountability, and 
transparency.24 The Commission emphasizes the importance of 
a stable and independent judiciary branch, composed of capable 
judges who can handle cases efficiently, which in practice has 
translated into greater weight placed on this element during the 
evaluation of applicant countries.25 Similarly, the Commission 

21. See Marktler, supra note 20, at 351 (stating that the Commission combines 
democracy and rule of law in its evaluation); see also Christophe Hillion, The Copenhagen 
Criteria and Their Progeny, in EU ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH 1, 3 (Christophe 
Hillion ed., 2004) (noting that the Copenhagen political criteria is based on principles 
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of 
law). 
22. See Dimitry Kochenov, Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Structure and Meaning 
of the Copenhagen Political Criterion of Democracy and The Rule of Law, 8 EUR. INTEGRATION 
ONLINE PAPERS 1, 14 (2004) (identifying five main areas of scrutiny related to the 
assessment of the democracy and rule of law criterion: elections, the functioning of the 
legislature, the functioning of the executive, the functioning of the judiciary, and anti-
corruption measures); see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 349–51 (noting that under the 
democracy and rule of law criterion, major attention is given to elections, the 
functioning of the executive, judiciary, and legislature, and corruption). 
23. See Geoffrey Pridham, EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post–
Communist States—Formality and Reality, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 953, 960 (2002) 
(indicating that the necessary measures for democracy and rule of law include holding 
municipal elections, an institution of direct elections for state president, and the 
involvement of opposition parties in parliamentary appointments); see also Kochenov, 
supra note 22, at 14–16 (stating that the Copenhagen political criteria may be satisfied 
by “free and fair elections,” a Parliament that operates satisfactorily, is respected, has 
an opposition partaking in its activities, and allows for minority representation). 
24. See Marktler, supra note 20, at 350–51 (noting the importance of adequate 
management, effectiveness, and executive transparency for democracy and the rule of 
law); see also Kochenov, supra note 22, at 18 (listing the main issues that the 
Commission focuses on in assessing the executive branch of a candidate country). 
25. See, e.g., Albania 2012 Progress Report, at 11, SWD (2012) 334 final (Oct. 10, 
2012) (outlining the factors generally used to assess the efficiency of the judiciary in a 
candidate country); see also Kochenov, supra note 22, at 20 (providing a list of factors 
considered in assessing the functionality of a candidate country’s judiciary, including 
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requires that effective anti-corruption measures be in place as 
part of this inquiry.26 This component of the political criterion 
aims to combat the widespread corruption plaguing the 
governments of applicant countries which include Serbia, 
Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania.27 
The Copenhagen political criterion also includes the 
Commission’s evaluation of human rights and minority 
protection in the candidate country. 28  The human rights 
element is based on an evaluation of a country’s fundamental 
human rights and international agreements on human rights.29 
The respect and protection of minorities, on the other hand, 
focuses on the ratification and implementation of the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, the first legally binding multilateral instrument 
pertaining to the general protection of national minorities.30 

the independence of the branch and the effective enforcement of the court’s 
decisions). 
26. See Kochenov, supra note 22, at 24 (indicating that the last element of the 
structure of the Copenhagen political criterion of democracy and the rule of law relates 
to anti-corruption measures); see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 351 (indicating that 
corruption is an element under the principles of democracy and the rule of law). 
27. See Kochenov, supra note 22, at 25 (noting that the Commission recognizes 
the widespread corruption in candidate countries in various sectors); see also Marktler, 
supra note 20, at 351 (noting the widespread corruption in candidate countries). 
28. See European Commission, Croatia 2011 Progress Report, at 8–9, SEC (2011) 
1200 final (Oct. 12, 2011) (indicating human rights and the protection of minorities 
are elements considered by the Commission under the Copenhagen political 
criterion); see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 352 (noting that human rights and 
minority protection also fall within the Copenhagen political criterion). 
29. See generally European Parliament, Democracy and Respect for Human Rights in 
the Enlargement Process of the European Union, Briefing No. 20 (Apr. 1, 1998), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/pdf/20a1_en.pdf (noting 
accession to the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and freedom of expression and association are some of 
the fundamental human rights assessed under the Copenhagen political criterion); 
Marktler, supra note 20, at 352 (indicating that generally accepted fundamental rights 
and international agreements are used by the Commission in their assessment of 
candidate countries’ compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria). 
30 . See Marktler, supra note 20, at 352 (discussing the need for candidate 
countries to implement the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities); see also Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities and Explanatory Report, H(95)10 pmbl. (Feb. 1995), available at http://
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_AtGlance/
PDF_H(95)10_FCNM_ExplanReport_en.pdf (explaining the intention of the 
1692 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1683 
Particular importance is placed on the protection of the Roma 
minority, which is discriminated against in many candidate 
countries.31 
2. Economic Criteria 
The Copenhagen economic criterion is also a twofold 
inquiry, requiring candidate countries to have (1) functioning 
market economies, and (2) the capacity to cope with 
competition and market forces within the European Union by 
the date of accession.32 Under the condition for a functioning 
market economy, the Commission monitors a number of sub-
criteria, such as macroeconomic stability, free interplay of 
market forces, and an adequate legal system for regulating the 
economy in the applicant country.33 The second sub-condition, 
the ability to cope with competition and market forces within 
the European Union, is assessed on the basis of factors which 
include the existence of a market economy, trade and 
investment integration with the European Union, and adequate 

Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities as a legally binding 
instrument concerned with the protection of national minorities). 
31. See European Commission, Support for the Roma and Communities in Central and 
Eastern Europe 4, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/brochure_roma_oct2003_
en.pdf (stating that the situation of minorities such as the Roma is “taken into 
consideration in assessing the capacity of candidate countries to become Members of 
the European Union”); see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 352 (noting the lack of 
progress by candidate countries in implementing the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities especially with regards to the Roma minority). 
32. See European Commission, Economic Accession Criteria, http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/international/enlargement/criteria/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) 
(explaining that the Copenhagen economic criteria requires acceding countries to be 
functioning market economies, and “to have, by the date of accession, the capacity to 
cope with competition and market forces within the EU”); European Commission, 
Progress Towards Meeting the Economic Criteria for EU Accession: The EU Commission’s 2012 
Assessments, in EUROPEAN ECONOMY 1, OCCASIONAL PAPERS 122 (Dec. 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/
ocp122_en.pdf [hereinafter European Economy] (identifying the existence of “a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union” as the Copenhagen economic criteria). 
33. See European Commission, Economic Accession Criteria, supra note 32 (listing 
the sub-criteria required for being a functional market economy); see also European 
Economy, supra note 32, at 2 (providing the sub-criteria applied by the Commission in 
examining the existence of a functional market economy); Marktler, supra note 20, at 
353 (citing the elements taken into consideration by the Commission in assessing a 
functional market economy). 
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sectorial and enterprise structures.34 The Commission’s inquiry 
into these subcategories is intended to provide a snapshot of the 
viability of the applicant country’s economy.35 
3. Legal/Acquis Criteria 
Finally, the Commission assesses a candidate country’s legal 
system and ability to take on the legal obligations of EU 
membership and to adopt, implement, and enforce the acquis 
comunautaire.36 The acquis is defined as the binding body of 
common rights and obligations applicable to all EU Member 
States. 37  Within this penumbra of EU laws fall all treaties, 
directives, regulations, decisions, declarations and resolutions, 
international agreements, and the judgments of the European 
Court of Justice.38 In fulfilling the Copenhagen acquis criterion, 
a candidate country must undergo legal affinity by both 

34. See European Commission, Economic Accession Criteria, supra note 32 (providing 
a list of what is required to be competitive in the European Union); see European 
Economy, supra note 32, at 2 (explaining in greater detail the factors used to assess a 
country’s capacity to withstand competitive pressure and market forces within the 
European Union); Marktler, supra note 20, at 354 (citing the definition used by the 
Commission in determining a country’s capacity to withstand competitive pressure and 
market forces within the European Union). 
35. See Marktler, supra note 20 (describing the subcategories of the elements used 
to evaluate an applicant country’s economy); see also European Economy, supra note 32 
(noting some of the factors used to assess the capacity of an applicant country’s 
capacity economy). 
36. See Christen B. Jacobsen, Implementing the Acquis Communautaire – The Fight 
Over 80.000 Pages 5 (Riga Graduate Sch. L., Working Paper No. 7, 2002) (noting that 
all candidate countries must formally accept the acquis communautaire and demonstrate 
the capacity to become constructive and loyal EU Members); see also Hillion, supra note 
21, at 8 (explaining that the applicant country has to demonstrate the ability to take on 
the obligations of membership, which entail the acceptance and observance of the 
acquis communautaire). 
37 Enlargement—Acquis, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2013) 
(defining acquis as “the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all 
the European Union Member States”); see Vaughne Miller, The EU’s Acquis 
Communautaire, SN/IA/5944, at 2 (Apr. 26, 2011) (noting that the acquis is the 
accumulated body of EU law and obligations from 1958 to date). 
38. See Enlargement—Acquis, supra note 37 (listing what the European Union 
acquis comprises of); see also Jacobsen, supra note 36, at 6–7 (dividing the acquis into 
fifteen different groups and identifying the wide variety of EU laws that fall within each 
group). 
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accepting the evolving nature of EU law and making EU law part 
of, and superior to, national law.39 
The Commission has divided all current EU rules into 
thirty-five different policy fields, known as chapters. 40  The 
chapters provide the rules of regulation within the European 
Union, from the free movement of goods, workers, services, and 
capital, to company law and science and research.41 For each 
chapter, the applicant country must negotiate the conditions 
and timing of the adoption, implementation, and enforcement 
of the rules within the country.42 The candidate countries are 
required to adopt the acquis in its entirety, but can negotiate 
about when and how each chapter shall be implemented during 
the accession process.43 The Commission analyzes the applicant 
country’s legal system through a process called screening, 
determines when each chapter should be adopted, and later 
closes each chapter after the relevant area of EU law fully 
implemented into the applicant’s national legal structure. 44 

39. See Jacobsen, supra note 36, at 7 (explaining that candidate countries must 
accept the dynamic nature of EU law and that EU law takes priority over national law); 
see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 355 (noting the importance that the Commission has 
given to the effective incorporation of community legislation into national legislation 
by candidate countries). 
40. Conditions for Membership, supra note 6 (stating that the acquis is divided into 35 
different policy fields); see also Miller, supra note 37, at 2 (noting that in preparing to 
join the European Union, acceding states must accept all the existing acquis which 
covers 35 policy areas). 
41 Chapters of the Acquis, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2013) (listing all 35 chapters of the acquis and providing a brief 
summary of what each chapter entails); see also Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 
28, at 25–66 (providing a list and analysis of all the chapters used to assess Croatia’s 
ability to assume the obligations of membership). 
42. See Conditions for Membership, supra note 6 (noting that the conditions and 
timing for the candidate’s adoption, implementation and enforcement of the acquis is 
negotiated by chapter); see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 354–55 (discussing the 
negotiation process for candidate countries in adopting the European Union acquis). 
43. See Conditions for Membership, supra note 6 (stating that the chapters themselves 
are not negotiable but the “candidates essentially agree on how and when to adopt and 
implement them”); see also The Accession Process for a New Member State, EUROPA, http://
europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/
l14536_en.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2013) (providing an overview of the negotiation 
process for candidate countries). 
44. See The Accession Process for a New Member State, supra note 43 (noting that the 
Council decides unanimously on the opening of a chapter and the benchmarks on the 
basis of the Commission’s recommendations); see also Steps Towards Joining, 
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Failure to adopt substantial reforms or discontinued efforts by 
the candidate country in meeting the benchmarks for a chapter 
can cause a closed chapter to reopen and suspension of open 
chapters.45 Otherwise, once the applicant country accepts the 
acquis and adopts each chapter necessary for accession into their 
national legal system, an Accession Treaty is signed to complete 
this process.46 
B. The “Uniqueness” and Accession Process of the Western Balkan 
Countries 
The European Union’s interest in the Western Balkan 
transition after the fall of Communism spurred aspirations of 
political and economic growth in the region, while providing 
the European Union with a way to achieve stability and 
diplomacy among these contentious states.47 The result was the 
development and implementation of a regional approach by the 
European Union towards the Western Balkans, a region 
encompassing Albania and all the former Yugoslavian states, 
with the exception of Slovenia.48 This regional approach was 

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining/index_en.htm (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2013) (providing a detailed explanation of the process of negotiation). 
45. See The Accession Process for a New Member State, supra note 43 (stating that a 
chapter can be reopened if the reforms are deemed insufficient); see also Steps Towards 
Joining, supra note 44 (noting that the Commission can reopen closed chapters if it is 
no longer satisfied with the candidate country’s progress in that policy field). 
46. See The Accession Process for a New Member State, supra note 43 (explaining that 
the Accession Treaty is signed when the Commission considers the candidate country’s 
reforms sufficient); see also Steps Towards Joining, supra note 44 (stating that even after 
the signing of the Accession Treaty, an acceding country must continue reforms to 
ensure that everything is completed before the Treaty becomes final and binding). 
47. See LUCIA VESNIC-ALUJEVIC, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OF WESTERN BALKANS: 
FROM RECONCILIATION TO EUROPEAN FUTURE 19 (2012), available at 
http://thinkingeurope.eu/sites/default/files/publication-
files/european_integration_of_western_balkans.pdf (observing that the European 
Union’s primary interest was in stabilizing the region since each country expressed 
interest in joining the European Union); see also Borzel & Risse, supra note 18, at 10 
(suggesting that given the European Union’s earlier success in consolidating 
democratic transition through enlargement as a transformation tool, membership 
conditionality was employed as an instrument to stabilize the Western Balkans region 
which the European Union considers vital to its geopolitical interests). 
48. See Council Regulation 533/2004, 2004 O.J. L 86/1 (identifying Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as the countries that compose the Western Balkans for 
SAP framework); see also Aleksandar Kostadinov, FDI Performance Index of Western Balkan 
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adopted during the Helsinki Council and became known as the 
SAP.49 Part I.B analyzes the accession process as applied to 
Western Balkan countries through the SAP framework. This Part 
then places the SAP in context by exploring the “uniqueness” of 
the Western Balkan region. 
1. The Accession Process for Western Balkan Countries 
The SAP creates extra requirements for accession vis-à-vis 
applicant countries from the Western Balkan region. It is guided 
primarily by the principle of conditionality, under which the 
European Union reserves the right to unilaterally impose 
sanctions and provide incentives in response to a candidate 
country’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and EU 
conditions.50 Thus, the conditionality of the SAP allows the 
European Union to singlehandedly control the pace of the 
accession process in Western Balkan states.51  
The SAP has three central aims: (1) political stability and 
swift transition to a market economy; (2) regional cooperation; 
and (3) the likelihood of EU membership.52 To achieve these 

Countries, 1 ANALYTICA J. 18 (2008) (stating that the Western Balkan refers to Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro). 
49. Dimitar Bechev, Carrots, Sticks and Norms: The EU and Regional Cooperation in 
Southeast Europe, 8 J. S. EUR. & BALKANS 27, 35 (2006) (stating that the Helsinki Council 
decided to replace its Regional Approach with the SAP); see Elbasani, supra note 5, at 
295-99 (outlining the history and development of the Regional Approach into the SAP 
for the Western Balkan countries). 
50. See Liu Zuokui, EU’s Conditionality and the Western Balkans’ Accession Roads, 2 J. 
ON EUR. PERSP. W. BALKANS 79, 83–84 (defining positive and negative conditionality 
policy employed by the European Union in achieving its objectives in the Western 
Balkan countries); see also Enik Pogace, Examining European Community Law 
Principles in a New Legal Context: Placing the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
Under the Constitutional Legal Framework of Albania 1, 10 (Queen Mary Sch. L. Legal 
Stud., 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1732546 
(noting that conditionality has been engraved into the Copenhagen criteria by 
providing incentives or restraints for candidate states to become EU Members). 
51. See Gorica Atanasova, Does Europeanization Equal Democratisation?, 1 ANALYTICA 
J. 1, 6–7 (2008) (noting the asymmetry in power over the process that arises out of 
conditionality); see also Heather Grabbe, Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty 
in the EU Accession Process, in THE POLITICS OF EUROPEANIZATION 303, (Kevin 
Featherstone & Claudio M. Radaelli eds., 2003) (arguing that conditionality gives the 
European Union greater control over the accession process). 
52. See 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, at 2–4, COM (2005) 561 final (Nov. 9, 
2005) (setting forth the European Union’s enlargement policy and insisting on the 
principle of conditionality for Western Balkan countries); Steps Towards Joining, supra 
note 44 (presenting the aims of the SAP). 
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aims and incentivize Western Balkan countries’ compliance with 
SAA requirements, the European Union employs a number of 
different tactics. For example, the European Union may employ 
trade concessions in the form of duty-free access to EU markets, 
economic and financial assistance through its Instrument for 
Pre-Accession Assistance (“IPA”), reconstruction, stabilization 
and development assistance, and, most importantly, SAAs, to 
meet the requirements of the SAP.53  
Moreover, SAAs provide both a legal and institutional 
framework for the accession process. On the one hand, they 
regulate relations between the Member States and the candidate 
country by functioning as a contractual relationship with legal 
effects under Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (“TFEU”).54 On the other hand, they provide 
for mechanisms and bodies charged with the implementation, 
administration, and monitoring of all areas covered by the 
SAA.55 The SAA covers a multitude of legal areas that are divided 
into ten titles that includes political dialogue, regional 
cooperation, free movement of goods and workers, and 
financial cooperation. 56  Upon receipt of an application for 
membership by a candidate country, the Commission issues a 

53. See Steps Towards Joining, supra note 44 (listing the instrumentalities employed 
by the European Union in guiding Western Balkan countries through the SAP); see also 
Bechev, supra note 49, at 35–36 (noting that the European Union agreed under the 
SAP framework to open its markets to allow Western Balkan countries duty-free access 
and to provide economic and financial assistance). 
54. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 218, 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 144–46 [hereinafter TFEU]; see Gjevori, supra 
note 10, at 440 (noting that the SAAs are EU association agreements that have legal 
effects in different legal orders under Article 218 of the TFEU); see also Pogace, supra 
note 50, at 17 (indicating that the SAA represents a contractual relation and a legal 
instrument between the European Union and the candidate country under Article 310 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community which is not Article 218 of the 
TFEU). 
55. See Pogace, supra note 50, at 16 (discussing the SAA between Albania and the 
European Union); see also Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning the Signature of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and its Member 
States and the Republic of Croatia on Behalf of the European Community, COM (2001) 371 
final (Sep. 9, 2001) [hereinafter SAA between European Community and Croatia] 
(providing an example of an SAA). 
56. See Pogace, supra note 50, at 16 (listing the titles that are included in the SAA 
between Albania and the European Union); see also SAA between European Community 
and Croatia, supra note 57 (providing a more extensive list of the titles it contains). 
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formal recommendation and feasibility report to the European 
Council on whether to sign an SAA.57 
The SAA leads the accession process when it enters into 
force and only lapses when a candidate country obtains EU 
membership.58 Within its framework, the Commission designates 
short and medium-term priorities for the candidate country to 
implement during the accession process in order to meet the 
accession criteria.59 In this regard, the SAAs have become a key 
part of the pre-accession phase and the Commission presents to 
the Council its opinion on whether the applicant country should 
be granted candidate status based on the country’s positive 
progress towards implementing the SAA.60 
For Western Balkan countries, the road to the European 
Union begins with the submission of a formal application to join 
the European Union, triggering a sequence of evaluation 
procedures.61 The candidate country then proceeds to negotiate 

57. See Archick, supra note 13, at 5 (indicating that the Commission issues a 
formal opinion on the aspirant country, after which the Council decides whether to 
accept the application); see also 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 10 
(stating that the Commission can recommend to the Council in a feasibility report 
whether and under what conditions the SAA negotiations should begin). 
58. Council Regulation 533/2004, on the Establishment of European Partnerships 
in the Framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process, 2004 O.J. L 86/1 (stating 
that the SAA provides the framework for the Western Balkan country’s accession 
process until their integration into the European Union). 
59. See Bruno S. Sergi & Qerim Qerimi, The Process of EU Enlargement Towards 
South-Eastern Europe: Current Challenges and Perspectives, 2007 SOUTH-EAST EUR. REV. 
LAB. & SOC. AFF. 57, 58 (2007) (describing the Accession Partnership and explaining 
that a candidate country must fulfill short-term and medium-term priorities designated 
by the Union in order to make progress towards meeting the accession criteria); see also 
Qerim Qerimi, South-east Europe’s EU Integration: Dreams and Realities, 2002 SOUTH-EAST 
EUR. REV. LAB. & SOC. AFF. 43, 45 (2002) (noting that the Union indicates short- and 
medium-term priorities for the candidate country to implement in making progress 
towards fulfilling the accession criteria). 
60. See 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 10 (indicating that upon 
proper implementation of the SAA, a country can move to the next phases of candidate 
status and then accession negotiations); see also European Commission, EU Enlargement 
Fact Sheet, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/publication/factsheet_
en.pdf (documenting the main steps to EU accession and noting that if the 
Commission has a favorable opinion of the applicant country’s status, the Council may 
decide to consider the applicant a candidate country). 
61. See On the Path to EU Membership: The EU Enlargement Process, EU INSIGHT 2 
(Dec. 2010) (noting that a country starts the process for EU membership by submitting 
an application resulting in a number of evaluations); see also ARCHICK, supra note 13, at 
5 (explaining that when a country submits an application to join the European Union, 
it triggers a complex process of evaluation). 
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an SAA, which determines the specific conditions that must be 
met by that country along with the Copenhagen criteria.62 As 
mentioned, the SAA imposes specific requirements for the 
member state and does not cover all of the conditions and 
criteria for EU membership, thus the Commission closely 
monitors a candidate country’s compliance with both the SAA 
conditions and the Copenhagen criteria.63 Compliance under 
the SAA and Copenhagen criteria typically occurs in stages, with 
the Commission submitting its evaluations through annual 
progress reports to the European Council and the European 
Parliament.64  
An applicant is granted candidate status at some point 
during this evaluation of its progress in meeting the SAA and 
Copenhagen criteria, and later enters accession negotiations.65 A 
satisfactory conclusion of negotiations leads to the submission of 
the Draft Accession Treaty for approval of the Council, the 
Commission, and the European Parliament. 66  The approved 
treaty is signed and submitted to all Member States and the 
candidate country for ratification in accordance with their 

62. See Benjamin Rey, Fact Sheets on the European Union – The Western Balkans, 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Jan. 2014), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.2.html (describing the accession 
process under the SAP framework for Western Balkan countries); see also Croatia: 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement Negotiations with Croatia Concluded, IP/01/688 
(May 14, 2001) (discussing the SAA negotiations between Croatia and the European 
Union). 
63. See Conditions for Membership, supra note 6 (noting that the Commission 
closely monitors compliance with the SAA and the Copenhagen criteria); see also Borzel 
& Risse, supra note 18, at 11 (stating that the Commission monitored and reported the 
progress of each candidate). 
64. See Conditions for Membership, supra note 6 (noting that the Commission 
keeps the Council and European Parliament informed throughout the process by 
submitting regular reports, strategy papers, and clarifications on conditions for further 
progress); see also Borzel & Risse, supra note 18, at 9 (stating that the Commission 
reported on the progress of each candidate country and made recommendations for 
improvements in an annual report presented to the European Council). 
65. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text (discussing the negotiation 
process once a candidate country enters the negotiations stage). 
66. See On the Path to EU Membership: The EU Enlargement Process, supra note 63 
(indicating that after negotiations are concluded to the satisfaction of both sides, a 
Draft Accession Treaty is submitted for approval to the Council of the European 
Union, the European Commission, and the European Parliament); see also EU 
Enlargement Fact Sheet, supra note 62 (stating that the accession treaty must be approved 
by the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European 
Parliament). 
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respective constitutional rules.67 Finally, the candidate country 
becomes an EU Member State on the date specified in the 
treaty.68  
2. Why the Western Balkan Region Presents a Unique Case 
The collapse of Communism and the violent disintegration 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia saw the emergence of new 
polarized and variegated nation states plagued by limited 
democratic experience, weak institutions that impeded politico-
economic progress, and dysfunctional economies.69 Realizing 
the new nations’ need for guidance, the European Union 
undertook significant efforts to sustain the regional transition to 
multiparty democracies and market economies. 70  The slow 
reform process and the lack of cooperation within the Western 
Balkan region, however, earned the region the label of Europe’s 
“black hole.”71 The effective implementation of the European 
Union’s regional approach required the European Union to 

67. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing the process for an 
accession treaty between the candidate country and the Member States). 
68. See Steps Towards Joining, supra note 44 (stating that a candidate country 
becomes a full EU Member on the date laid down in the treaty); see also On the Path to 
EU Membership: The EU Enlargement Process, supra note 63 (indicating that the candidate 
country becomes an EU Member State once the treaty enters into force on its 
scheduled date). 
69. See Leeda Demetropoulou, Europe and the Balkans: Membership Aspiration, EU 
Involvement and Europeanization Capacity in South Eastern Europe, 3 SOUTHEAST EUR. POL. 
87, 87–88 (2002) (describing the effects that the collapse of Communism and the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia had on the Balkan region); see also Panagiotou, supra note 
54, at 358–59 (illustrating the impact of communism and its aftermath in Albania as an 
example of the transition for other countries in the Balkan region). 
70. See Sergi & Qerimi, supra note 61, at 61 (observing that following the post-
communism changes that took place in the Balkan region the European Union 
undertook a series of measures to ensure the continued transition to multiparty 
democracies and market economies); see also Gergana Noutcheva, EU Conditionality 
And Balkan Compliance: Does Sovereignty Matter? 1 (Apr. 17, 2006) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) (on file with author) (reporting that the 
incentives provided by EU membership stimulated reform in the establishment of 
liberal democracies and market economies during the transition period for Western 
Balkan countries). 
71. See Atanasova, supra note 51, at 1 (indicating that despite belonging to Europe 
geographically, the Western Balkans have been labeled as the ‘black hole’ of the 
continent); see also Gaelle Perio, EU-Western Balkan Relations: The European Bermuda 
Triange?, EUROPEAN ISSUE (Feb 20, 2011), at 6, available at http://www.robert-
schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-195-en.pdf (arguing that the Balkans are 
the ‘black hole’ and cause of problems within the European Union). 
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perform a balancing act whereby its priorities of stabilization 
and regional cooperation in the Western Balkans were weighed 
against the individual state competition created by the SAP, as 
only states that worked to conform and meet the requirements 
for accession moved forward in the accession process. 72 
Conditionality became the European Union’s instrument of 
choice in achieving this balance, and the cornerstone of the 
SAP.73 
While adopting the European Union acquis was sufficient to 
ensure membership during the first four Western Europe 
enlargements, the EU enlargement strategy became even more 
stringent toward the Western Balkan countries, with 
conditionality taking the form of a “carrot and stick” policy.74 
The guaranteed access to different SAP stages provided 
powerful incentives for compliance with the political and 
economic conditions.75 The European Union also believed that 
conditionality alongside the Copenhagen criteria would allow 

72. See Jacques Rupnik, The Balkans as a European Question, in THE WESTERN 
BALKANS AND THE EU: ‘THE HOUR OF EUROPE’ 17, 20 (Jacques Rupnik ed., 2011) 
(recognizing that the question of whether the European Union can develop a coherent 
regional approach relates back to the debate on the regional priorities of the Stability 
Pact versus the individual competition encouraged by the SAP); see also Atanasova, 
supra note 51, at 1 (juxtaposing two dimensions of the European Union approach 
towards the Western Balkans, namely, the European Union’s role as a soft arbiter 
focused on mediation and conflict resolution in the region and the prospect of 
membership offered to Western Balkan countries). 
73. See Zuokui, supra note 50, at 83–84 (analyzing conditionality as it is applied to 
Western Balkan countries by the European Union); see Tina Freyburg & Solveig 
Richter, National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of EU Political Conditionality in the 
Western Balkans 1 (Nat’l Ctr. Competence Res., Working Paper No. 19, 2008) (affirming 
that conditionality is aimed to induce behavioral adaptation by the applicant Western 
Balkan countries in response to incentives offered by the European Union); see also 
Elbasani, supra note 5, at 299 (identifying conditionality as the “very ‘cement of the 
SAP’”). 
74 . See Zuokui, supra note 50, at 83–84 (defining positive and negative 
conditionality as the “carrot and stick” policy employed by the European Union in 
achieving its objectives in the Western Balkan countries); see also Pogace, supra note 50, 
at 10 (noting that conditionality has been engraved into the Copenhagen criteria by 
providing incentives or restraints for candidate states to become EU Members). 
75. See Trauner, supra note 4, at 7 (commenting on the fact that access to 
different stages of the SAP provides an incentive for Western Balkan countries to 
comply with EU conditionality); see also Zuokui, supra note 50, at 83–84 (identifying EU 
membership, trade preferences and participation in programmes as some of the 
benefits Western Balkan countries derive from satisfying political and economic 
conditions). 
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the Commission to impartially assess a candidate country’s 
compliance and thereby result in merit-based accession.76  
The unique social, economic, and political character of the 
Western Balkan region, along with its reputation as a source of 
organized crime, unwanted migrant labor, and other problems, 
seems to shed light on the development of the SAP and SAAs as 
a key part of the accession process for Western Balkan countries. 
II. PLACING IT ALL IN CONTEXT: ACCESSION IN CROATIA 
AND ALBANIA 
Part II analyzes the application of both the SAP and the 
Copenhagen criteria to candidate countries by closely 
examining the process in two Western Balkan countries, Croatia 
and Albania. Part II.A provides a brief overview of the benefits 
derived from the accession for both the European Union and 
the Western Balkan countries. It further examines Croatia’s 
accession process and juxtaposes it with Albania’s accession 
process in order to provide a nuanced understanding of the 
accession criteria and SAP as applied. 
A. Balancing Mutual Benefits 
An analysis of the accession process for Western Balkan 
countries gives rise to the question of why a Western Balkan 
country would want to embark upon such a lengthy process? 
What is gained? For Western Balkan countries, participation in 
the accession process and EU membership carries geopolitical 
and economic benefits that are difficult to overlook.77 From 
2007 to 2013, over the span of just six years, the Western Balkan 

76. See Kochenov, supra note 22, at 23 (arguing that the Copenhagen criteria and 
EU’s conditionality were used to introduce a system on the basis of which the 
Commission could impartially assess a candidate country’s compliance with its 
conditions and criteria); see also Zuokui, supra note 50, at 92 (affirming that the 
European Union emphasizes the objectivity of conditionality that the Commission must 
apply to all candidates equally and at all times). 
77. See Bartol Letica, Europe’s Second Chance: European Union Enlargement To Croatia 
And The Western Balkans, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 209, 215 (2004) (indicating that 
applicant states want to join the European union because of the economic and 
geopolitical benefits that come with membership); see also Qerimi, supra note 61, at 46 
(explaining that the first motivation for Western Balkan countries to join the European 
Union was the desire to change to pluralist democracies and have access to economic 
benefits). 
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candidate countries received close to EU€12 billion in funding 
through the IPA program to help in institution building, cross-
border cooperation, and rural, regional, and cross-border 
development.78 The visa liberalization process, which allowed 
visa-free travel to the European Union, is another benefit 
derived from the accession process and employed by the 
European Union to incentivize the strengthening of reform 
efforts.79 The European Union also offers a political security 
dimension, which allows leaders in candidate countries to 
implement changes, such as introducing new legislation that 
would otherwise be domestically unpopular.80  Moreover, EU 
membership enables the Western Balkan countries to 
disentangle themselves from the past by giving them a sense of 
belonging within Europe.81  
The benefits that flow from Western Balkan membership 
are also advantageous to the European Union. The Western 
Balkan countries are considered the European Union’s 
“backyard” and have strong economic and social ties to other 

78. See European Commission, Overview—Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/index_en.htm (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2014) (providing an overview of the IPA, its purpose and its legal basis); see 
also 2011 ANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR ENLARGEMENT 5, (2012), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/
2011_ipa_annual_report_with_annex_new_en.pdf (discussing the IPA as applied to the 
Western Balkan countries). 
79. See Florian Trauner, EU Justice and Home Affairs Strategy in the Western Balkans: 
Conflicting Objectives in the Pre-Accession Strategy 1, 14 (Ctr. for Eur. Policy Stud., Working 
Paper No. 259, 2007) (noting the European Union’s use of visa liberalization to effect 
change in the Western Balkan countries); see also Igor Stiks, The European Union and 
Citizenship Regimes In the Western Balkans, in THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE EU: ‘THE 
HOUR OF EUROPE’, supra note 72, at 123, 129 (explaining the importance of visa 
liberalization for the European Union and how it is employed towards the Western 
Balkan countries). 
80. See Mustafa Turkes & Goksu Gokgoz, The European Union’s Strategy Towards the 
Western Balkans: Exclusion or Integration?, 20 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 659, 665 (2006) 
(noting that security plays an important role in motivating candidate countries to join 
the European Union); see also Letica, supra note 79, at 216 (explaining that EU 
membership allows leaders of Western Balkan countries to implement changes that 
would not garner popular support and also insulates them from bureaucratic and 
interest group pressures). 
81. See Letica, supra note 79, at 216 (explaining the symbolic value of belonging 
that joining the European Union carries for Western Balkan countries); see also Turkes 
& Gokgoz, supra note 82, at 664–65 (observing the desire of individual Western Balkan 
countries to dissociate themselves from their past and “rid themselves of the dreaded 
name ‘the Balkans’”). 
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Member States.82 Without control over the region, this can have 
a negative spillover effect that can compromise the Union’s 
security and stability.83 Thus, through the integration of the 
Western Balkan countries, the European Union can avoid the 
shame of losing its sphere of influence and geo-strategic 
position, increase its international presence, and simultaneously 
preserve its community-based identity.84 Moreover, the Western 
Balkans house the most pro-Western Muslim and secular 
communities in Europe and the Islamic world, providing both 
geopolitical and economic benefits. 85  From the European 
Union’s standpoint, conditionality in the accession process can 
be translated into a formula that benefits both the Western 
Balkan countries and the European Union: compliance with the 
European Union’s requirements equals new perquisites for the 
Western Balkans which in turn equals better control over the 
region and less problems for the European Union.86  

82. See Adam Balcer, Putting European House in Order: The EU and the Western 
Balkans, in IN SEARCH OF A NEW PARADIGM: THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE EU 
INTEGRATION 7, 21 (2013), available at http://www.demosservices.home.pl/www/files/
demos_paradigm.pdf (emphasizing the geographical proximity and the close links 
between the Western Balkans and the European Union); see also Noutcheva, supra note 
72, at 234 (noting the Western Balkan’s geographical location as the European Union’s 
backyard). 
83. See Balcer, supra note 82, at 21 (highlighting the potential for a domino effect 
from the Western Balkan countries that can destabilize the European Union); see also 
Noutcheva, supra note 72, at 234 (stating that the European Union is most interested in 
maintaining security and stability). 
84. See Noutcheva, supra note 72, at 2 (discussing the different reasons for 
European Union’s enlargement policy); Perio, supra note 73, at 8 (indicating that the 
European Union would not want to lose its sphere of influence over the Western 
Balkans to the United States); see also Turkes & Gokgoz, supra note 80, at 666 (arguing 
that the accession of the Western Balkan countries would increase the European 
Union’s international presence). 
85. See Balcer, supra note 82, at 22–23 (emphasizing that the importance of the 
Western Balkans for the European Union derives from their large native Muslim 
communities); see also Perio, supra note 73, at 8 (asserting the importance of the 
multifariousness of religions and ethnicities in the Western Balkans for the European 
Union). 
86. See generally Zuokui, supra note 50 (explaining the impact of conditionality on 
economic, political and legal reform in Western Balkan countries); Elke Thiel, 
European Integration of Albania: Economic Aspects 1 (Bamberg Econ. Res. Grp., Working 
Paper No. 49, 2004) (stating that although EU membership may be the ultimate goal, 
the accession process is what brings the rewards). 
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B. Case Studies: The Application of the Accession Criteria to Croatia 
and Albania 
In light of the foregoing discussion and the context it 
provides, this Part examines the EU accession process in two 
Western Balkan countries, Croatia and Albania.87 An analysis of 
Croatia, which was the first Western Balkan country to 
successfully complete the SAP and become an EU Member 
State, provides a fuller understanding of the Western Balkan 
accession process from inception to completion.88 This process 
is then compared to Albania’s ongoing accession. The 
comparison between the two countries serves to highlight the 
effect that the requirements under the SAP and the policy of 
conditionality has had in significantly slowing down the overall 
process for Western Balkan countries.89 

87. See supra Part I.B and Part II.A and accompanying notes. 
88. See supra notes 1, 6 and accompanying text. 
89. See supra note 8–12 and accompanying text. 
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TABLE 1: Timeline Comparing Croatia and Albania’s EU 
Accession Process 
Date Key Stages for Croatia Key Stages for Albania 
November 
2000 
SAP is launched by the EU as the policy to govern 
accession for the five countries of South-Eastern 
Europe (the Balkan countries)
October 
2001 
Croatia and the EU sign 
the SAA 
 
January 
2003 
 Negotiations for SAA 
between Albania and 
EU launched
February 
2003 
Croatia submits formal 
application for EU 
membership 
 
June 2003 Thessaloniki European Council confirms the 
application of SAP and SAAs to the Western Balkan 
countries 
April 2004 Commission issues positive 
opinion on Croatia’s 
application for EU 
membership
 
June 2004 Croatia obtains the status 
of candidate country and 
the Council sets entry 
negotiations to begin in 
2005 
February 
2005 
SAA for Croatia enters 
into force 
October 
2005 
ICTY confirms Croatia’s 
cooperation, screening 
stage of accession 
negotiations begins and 
accession negotiations are 
launched 
June 2006  Albania and the EU 
sign the SAA
April 2009 SAA for Albania 
enters into force and 
2014] FROM RAGS TO RICHES 1707 
Albania submits 
application for EU 
membership
June 2011 Accession negotiations 
formally end for Croatia – 
last of 35 negotiated 
chapters is closed meaning 
Croatia implemented the 
acquis communautaire and 
was ready to undertake the 
obligations of EU 
membership 
 
October 
2011 
Commission adopts 
favorable opinion of 
Croatia’s accession to the 
EU and issues last progress 
report 
December 
2011 
Croatia and the 27 EU 
Member States sign the 
EU Accession Treaty 
June 2012  Commission issues 
opinion on Albania’s 
application for EU 
membership and lays 
out 12 key priorities to 
be fulfilled in view of 
opening accession 
negotiations
October 
2012 
Commission 
recommends that 
Albania be granted 
candidate status 
July 2013 Croatia joins the EU 
December 
2013 
 EU Member States 
vote to postpone 
decision on whether 
to grant Albania 
candidate status until 
June 2014
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C. Croatia’s Road to the European Union 
Having declared its independence from the Yugoslav 
Federation in 1991, Croatia’s sovereignty and the process of 
state-building were afflicted by a number of tribulations.90 For 
Croatia, EU membership was not only viewed as the best means 
of escaping the regional and national problems facing a newly 
independent country, but also as a return to Europe.91 From the 
outset, Croatia was a frontrunner for EU membership in the 
Western Balkan region because of its developed economy, 
stronger institutional framework, and more stable political 
environment. 92  It maintained this positive trajectory toward 
member status by signing an SAA in October 2001, and formally 
applying for membership shortly after on February 21, 2003.93 
The European Union also appeared keen to make Croatia a 
member, granting Croatia candidate status just one year after its 
application for membership. For Albania, on the other hand, 
even a four-year time lapse was insufficient to obtain candidate 
status. 94 This momentum, however, came to an abrupt halt on 
March 16, 2005, a day before the scheduled commencement of 
accession negotiations, when the Commission concluded that 
Croatia’s cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal 

90 . See Jovic, supra note 7, at 205 (discussing Croatia’s declaration of 
independence, its limited sovereignty and subsequent problems); see also Noutcheva, 
supra note 72 (explaining the aftermath of the dissolution of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia). 
91. See Jovic, supra note 7, at 206 (explaining that Croatians emphasize the 
European roots of national identity and saw EU membership as a way of “‘departing 
from the Balkans’ and ‘returning back home’”); see also Letica, supra note 79, at 216 
(highlighting that besides the economic and geopolitical benefits, EU membership 
held a symbolic value for Croatia because it proved that they belonged to Europe). 
92. See Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, at 3 (stating that the SAA 
between Croatia and the European Union was signed in October, 2001 and providing 
timeline for subsequent steps towards accession); see also Trauner, supra note 4, at 10 
(providing a brief description and timeline of Croatia’s accession process). 
93. See Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, at 3 (stating that the SAA 
between Croatia and the European Union was signed in October 2001 and providing 
timeline for subsequent steps towards accession); see also Trauner, supra note 4, at 10 
(providing a brief description and timeline of Croatia’s accession process). 
94. See European Commission, Key Findings on the 2011 Progress Report on Croatia 2, 
MEMO/11/688 (Oct. 12, 2011) (providing key dates for Croatia’s accession process); 
see also Florian Trauner, EU Justice and Home Affairs Strategy in the Western Balkans: 
Conflicting Objectives in the Pre-Accession Strategy 8 (Ctr. for Eur. Policy Stud., Working 
Paper No. 259, 2007) (noting that the Council granted Croatia the status of candidate 
in June 2004). 
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for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) was insufficient.95 The ICTY, 
a body created by the United Nations to try leaders of genocide 
and war crimes, reported that for over four years Croatia failed 
to extradite the fugitive General Ante Gotovina, who was 
indicted for war crimes. 96  The European Union, therefore, 
conditioned Croatia’s accession on cooperation with the ICTY, 
separate and aside from its satisfaction of the traditional 
Copenhagen criteria, pursuant to the added requirements for 
accession imposed by SAAs under the SAP.97 
Croatia had difficulty meeting the political component of 
the Copenhagen criteria amid the added conditional 
requirements imposed by the EU and allowed by the SAP.98 Not 
only was Croatia required to comply with the traditional 
Copenhagen political criteria, but also had to comply with the 
additional requirements under the SAA of cooperation with the 
ICTY and regional cooperation with other Western Balkan 
states. 99  These additional political conditions generated 
considerable domestic resentment in Croatia where many saw 
mandatory cooperation with the ICTY as an EU attack on 

95. See Archick, supra note 13, at 6 (asserting that the start of accession talks for 
Croatia’s was delayed because EU Members believed that Croatia was not cooperating 
sufficiently with the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 
in apprehending a war suspect); see also Bechev, supra note 49, at 40 (stating that failure 
of the Croatian government to cooperate with the ICTY resulted in the postponement 
of membership negotiations). 
96. See Freyburg & Richter, supra note 75, at 10 (pointing out that the extradition 
of General Ante Gotovina was the crucial case for Croatia’s compliance with the ICTY 
criterion); see also Letica, supra note 79, at 221 (positing that the “case of General Ante 
Gotovina became the ultimate measure of Croatia’s cooperation with the Tribunal”). 
97. See 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 3 (emphasizing that the 
European Union will apply fair and rigorous conditionality towards applicant countries 
especially with regards to cooperation with the ICTY); see also Freyburg & Richter, supra 
note 75, at 10 (indicating that the Council decided to schedule accession talks with 
Croatia on condition that they fully comply with the ICTY). 
98 . See Marktler, supra note 20, at 360 (discussing the requirement for 
cooperation with the ICTY under the political criteria); see also 2005 Enlargement 
Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 20 (indicating under the political criteria for 
membership that problems arose with Croatia regarding the requirement of full 
cooperation with the ICTY). 
99 . See Marktler, supra note 20, at 360 (discussing the requirement for 
cooperation with the ICTY under the political criteria); see also 2005 Enlargement 
Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 20 (indicating under the political criteria for 
membership that problems arose with Croatia regarding the requirement of full 
cooperation with the ICTY). 
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Croatia’s sovereignty and national identity.100  The European 
Union sent a clear message in response—it valued the 
conditionality that it was allowed under the SAP and an 
applicant country’s failure to comply would bring the accession 
process to an abrupt standstill.101 
As for the traditional Copenhagen political criteria, from 
an early stage in the accession process the Commission 
concluded that Croatia was a functioning democracy with stable 
institutions that guaranteed the rule of law.102 Croatia continued 
to have free and fair elections and respected fundamental 
human rights.103 Yet, throughout Croatia’s accession process, the 
protection of minorities, especially the Serbs and Roma, and the 
implementation of agreements with the force of law that 
facilitated the return of Serb refugees, were flagged as areas for 
political improvement.104 Further, issues with the judicial system 

100. See Freyburg & Richter, supra note 75, at 11 (characterizing the Croatian 
protests to cooperation with the ICTY as “‘attacking the sovereignty of the Croatian 
state,’ ‘insulting the Croatian identity‘,’ and ‘defaming the holy homeland war’”); see 
also Jovic, supra note 7, at 205 (observing that since Croatia declared its independence, 
many felt that its sovereignty had been very limited by its obligations towards the ICTY). 
101. See Freyburg & Richter, supra note 75, at 9 (noting that the European Union 
consistently followed a policy of conditionality regarding cooperation with the ICTY 
where non-compliance was a ‘knock-out’ criterion for membership); see also 2005 
Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 6 (emphasizing that the “sustained full 
cooperation with the ICTY will remain a requirement for progress throughout the 
accession process” and that “[l]ess than full cooperation with ICTY at any stage will 
affect the overall progress of negotiations and could lead to the suspension of the 
negotiations”). 
102 . See European Commission, Croatia: Commission Recommends Opening of 
Accession Negotiations 1, IP/04/507, at 1 (Apr. 20, 2004) (indicating that Croatia met the 
democracy and rule of law elements of the Copenhagen political criteria); see also 
Marktler, supra note 20, at 360 (noting that Croatia was considered by the Commission 
a functioning democracy with functioning institutions that guarantee the rule of the 
law). 
103. See Croatia: Commission Recommends Opening of Accession Negotiations, supra 
note 102, at 1 (indicating that Croatia met the elements of the Copenhagen political 
criteria); see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 360 (noting that Croatia was considered to 
have met some aspects of the Copenhagen political criteria). 
104. See Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, at 8–13 (assessing Croatia’s 
compliance with the human rights and the protection of minorities requirement of the 
Copenhagen political criterion); see also 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 
52, at 5 (asserting that Croatia needed to make additional efforts in improving the 
situation of minorities and facilitate the return of refugees). 
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and the fight against corruption were among the criteria 
demanding the greatest reform.105 
Despite its initial setback in satisfying the Copenhagen 
political criteria and the additional requirements under the 
SAP, Croatia eventually cooperated with the ICTY and began 
accession negotiations. 106  Croatia also established bilateral 
relations with neighboring countries and took regional 
initiatives as evidence of its regional cooperation.107 Progress 
under the political criterion was short-lived, however, and in 
December 2008, the negotiation process was stalled for ten 
months when neighboring Slovenia, an EU member, blocked 
Croatia’s accession due to a dispute over the maritime border in 
the Gulf of Piran.108 Since a single EU Member State has the 
power to halt EU accession of candidate countries, it was not 
until September 2009 that Slovenia decided to allow accession 
negotiations to continue and detach the border dispute from 
Croatia’s EU membership bid.109  

105 . See Marktler, supra note 20, at 360 (documenting the Commission’s 
recommendation that Croatia increase its efforts to fight against corruption and reform 
the judicial system); see also Croatia: Commission Recommends Opening of Accession 
Negotiations, supra note 104, at 2 (indicating that Croatia needs additional efforts in the 
field of judicial reform and fight against corruption). 
106. See Archick, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that accession talks with Croatia 
opened in October 2005 upon determination by the European Union that Croatia was 
in full compliance with the ICTY); see also 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 
52, at 21 (indicating that in October 2005 the Council decided to move forward with 
accession negotiations after concluding that the condition for cooperation with the 
ICTY had been met by Croatia). 
107. See 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 5 (noting that Croatia 
had made good progress on regional cooperation in terms of regional initiative and 
bilateral relations with neighbors); see also Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, 
at 13–16 (discussing Croatia’s progressing in meeting the regional issues and 
international obligations requirement under the Copenhagen political criteria). 
108. See Elitsa Vucheva, Slovenia to Block Croatia EU Accession Talks, EUOBSERVER, 
Dec. 18, 2008, http://euobserver.com/enlargement/27314 (reporting that Slovenia 
blocked Croatia’s accession talks due to a long-running border dispute between the two 
countries); see also Archick, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that Croatia’s accession talks 
were stalled in December 2008 when EU Member Slovenia began blocking negotiations 
because of a border dispute). 
109. See Slovenia Unblocks Croatian EU Bid, BBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2009) http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8250441.stm (informing that Slovenia decided to lift its block on 
Croatia’s accession bid in September 2009); see also Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, A House of 
Cards? Building the Rule of Law in the Balkans, in THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE EU: 
‘THE HOUR OF EUROPE’, supra note 72, at 145, 167 (noting that Slovenia’s blockade of 
Croatia’s EU accession efforts ended in September 2009). 
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For the most part, Croatia avoided similar tribulations in 
meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria because gross 
domestic product (GDP), inflation, unemployment, literacy and 
life expectancy data indicated that Croatia was almost twice as 
developed as other Western Balkan countries and more 
developed than some EU members.110 As a functioning market 
economy, Croatia was able to achieve a considerable degree of 
macroeconomic stability, low inflation, and a developed 
infrastructure and labor force.111 While the Commission did 
require certain specific added economic reforms for Croatia, 
particularly regarding its high external indebtedness, weak 
judicial and administrative structures, unemployment, and slow 
privatization, Croatia took affirmative steps to act on these 
required changes.112 For example, Croatia made progress in 
containing the rising deficit and stabilizing the gross external 
debt.113 As a result, the Commission concluded that Croatia 
would be able to cope with competitive pressures and market 
forces within the European Union if it continued its reform and 
removed any lingering weaknesses.114  

110. See Letica, supra note 79, at 217 (stating that Croatia was more developed in 
all key economic indicators than the Western Balkan countries and the new members 
joining the European Union in May 2004); see also Rupnik, supra note 74, at 21 
(emphasizing that based on economic performance Croatia could have joined the 
European Union with Romania and Bulgaria in 2007). 
111. See European Economy, supra note 32, at 10 (noting that Croatia is a 
functioning market economy maintaining an appropriate macroeconomic policy and 
low inflation); see also Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, at 16–23 (reporting 
on Croatia’s progress in meeting the requirements under the functioning market 
economy aspect of the Copenhagen economic criteria). 
112. See Main Findings of the Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia’s State of 
Preparedness for EU Membership, at 5, COM (2012) 601 final (Oct. 10, 2012) [hereinafter 
Croatia’s State of Preparedness for EU Membership] (providing a summary of Croatia’s 
progress in meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria and highlighting the areas 
requiring continued reform); see also European Economy, supra note 32, at 6–10 
(reporting on the need for continued structural reforms and privatization). 
113. See Croatia’s State of Preparedness for EU Membership, supra note 116, at 5 
(noting Croatia’s development in meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria); see also 
European Economy, supra note 32, at 6–10 (discussing the Copenhagen economic 
criteria for Croatia). 
114 . See European Economy, supra note 32, at 10 (indicating that the 
implementation of structural reforms would enable Croatia to cope with competitive 
pressures and market forces within the European Union in the near term); see also 
Croatia’s State of Preparedness for EU Membership, supra note 114, at 5 (restating that 
structural reforms would enable Croatia to cope with competitive pressures and market 
forces within the European Union in the near term). 
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Croatia also demonstrated that it was capable of taking on 
the legal obligations of EU membership by adopting and 
implementing EU legislation to align itself with the acquis.115 
From an early stage Croatia was able to implement EU 
legislation into its national legal system, specifically in the areas 
of freedom of movement for workers, company law, intellectual 
property rights, financial services, economic and monetary 
policy, statistics, trans-European networks, science and research, 
education and culture, as well as foreign security and defense 
policy.116 Yet, even after accession negotiations were closed and 
Croatia was deemed to have met all of the conditions set in 
negotiation, a few outstanding issues remained.117 These issues 
pertained to the acquis chapters dedicated to the right of 
establishment and freedom to provide services, agriculture and 
rural development, food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary 
policy, fisheries, regional policy and coordination of structural 
instruments, and environment.118  Additionally, the European 
Union required Croatia to reform its tax regime to finalize the 

115. See, e.g., Croatia 2005 Progress Report, at 48–109, SEC (2005) 1424 (Nov. 9, 
2005) (listing all the acquis chapters that were negotiated for Croatia and the 
Commission’s assessment for each chapter); see also Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra 
note 28, at 25-65 (providing the acquis chapters and Croatia’s progress in each 
chapter). 
116. See Croatia’s State of Preparedness for EU Membership, supra note 112, at 15 
(providing a summary of all the acquis chapters where the Commission deemed Croatia 
to have met its commitments and requirements); see also Enlargement Strategy and 
Main Challenges 2011-2012, at 34-38, COM (2011) 666 final (Oct. 12, 2011) 
(summarizing the progress made by Croatia in meeting the benchmarks for each acquis 
chapter). 
117. See Croatia’s State of Preparedness for EU Membership, supra note 112, at 5 
(noting that although Croatia continued to make progress in adopting and 
implementing EU legislation, the Commission identified a number of issues requiring 
further attention by the date of membership); see also Monitoring Report on Croatia’s 
Accession Preparations, at 10 (Apr. 24, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
commission_2010-2014/fule/docs/news/20120424_report_final.pdf (indicating that 
although Croatia had achieved a good level of alignment in most acquis chapters a 
limited number of issues still remained). 
118. See Monitoring Report on Croatia’s Accession Preparations, supra note 117, at 11–
12 (providing a brief description of all the acquis chapters assessed by the Commission 
as needing increased efforts on Croatia’s part); see also Croatia’s State of Preparedness 
for EU Membership, supra note 112, at 35–38 (summarizing the Commission’s 
evaluation of Croatia’s progress in meeting the benchmarks for each acquis chapter). 
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restructuring process for its national shipyards, pursuant to its 
specific obligations under its SAA.119 
Croatia and the EU Member States signed an Accession 
Treaty on December 9, 2011, after Croatia substantially adopted 
the acquis and concluded negotiations regarding the satisfaction 
of the remaining obligations under the SAA and the 
Copenhagen criteria.120 Article 36 of this treaty required the 
Commission to provide six monthly progress assessments on 
Croatia’s efforts to implement the remaining negotiated 
commitments. 121  Finally, Croatia became a Member of the 
European Union on July 1, 2013, after all remaining SAA 
obligations and outstanding Copenhagen criteria were met and 
the treaty was ratified by the national parliaments of all 
Members States.122 
D. Albania’s Road to the European Union 
Despite being grouped with the former Yugoslavian states, 
Albania’s accession experience varies from the process in 
Croatia and presents and highlights the disparate effects that the 
conditionality principle of the SAP can have on accession for 
Western Balkan countries. Having been an independent and 
sovereign state since 1912, Albania did not face the territorial 
status and border-drawing conflicts that other former 
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119 . See European Commission, State Aid: Commission Approves Changes to 
Restructuring Plan of Croatian Shipyard 3.Maj 1, IP/13/565 (Jun. 19, 2013) (reporting 
that Croatia’s EU accession act provided for privatization of all shipyards in financial 
difficulty before July 1, 2013); see also Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, at 4 
(stating that Croatia brought its “tax regime on coffee into line with its SAA 
obligations” and “complied with State aid rules in relation to the shipyards in 
difficulty”). 
120. See Monitoring Report on Croatia’s Accession Preparations, supra note 117, at 2 
(indicating that accession negotiations with Croatia were closed as a result of Croatia 
fulfilling all the benchmarks set in the negotiated chapters and the Accession Treaty 
was signed by Member States and Croatia on December 9, 2011); see also Croatia’s State 
of Preparedness for EU Membership, supra note 112, at 2 (specifying that after 
accession negotiations with Croatia were closed and the Commission rendered a 
favorable opinion, the Accession Treaty was signed on December 9, 2011). 
121. Treaty of Accession of Croatia art. 36, Apr. 24, 2012, 2012 O.J. L 112/10. 
122. See Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, at 4 (specifying that after the 
accession treaty is ratified by the present Member States and Croatia in line with their 
constitutional requirements, Croatia becomes an EU Member on July 1, 2013); see also 
Mahony, supra note 1 (noting that Croatia became an EU Member on July 1, 2013). 
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Yugoslavian nations encountered. 123  Albania’s ethnic 
homogeneity also allowed it to avoid the domestic inter-ethnic 
problems that threatened the stability of other countries in the 
region. 124  Particularly during the Kosovo crisis, Albania’s 
restrained response in not waging war for the genocide of 
Albanian-Kosovars by Serbia enabled it to largely elude the 
threat posed to the country’s stability.125 Furthermore, Albania’s 
governmental secularism contributed to the harmony between 
its Islam, Catholic, and Eastern Orthodox religions.126 
Despite these differences with Croatia and other 
Yugoslavian nations, Albania began its accession process in early 
2003, years after Croatia.127 Immediately after commencing SAA 
negotiations, these discussions ceased because the Commission 
expressed serious concerns about Albania’s political system and 
its efforts in fighting corruption and organized crime.128 SAA 
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123. See Panagiotou, supra note 54, at 360 (noting that unlike the states that 
emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Albania had been an independent state 
and did not have the same territorial and border issues that faced its neighboring 
countries); see also Pogace, supra note 50, at 4–5 (providing a brief history of Albania). 
124. See Panagiotou, supra note 54, at 360 (explaining that Albania lacks inter-
ethnic problems because it is almost entirely ethnically homogeneous unlike most 
other countries in the region); see also About Albania, ALBANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFF., http://www.mfa.gov.al/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
5402%3Arreth-shqiperise&catid=46%3Arreth-shqiperise&lang=en (last updated July 12, 
2010) (indicating that Albania’s population consists of ninety-five percent Albanians, 
three percent Greek, and two percent other ethnicities). 
125. See Panagiotou, supra note 54, at 361 (observing that during the 1999-2000 
crisis in Kosovo, Albania’s response was decidedly restrained denying any interest in 
pursuing unification with an independent Kosovo); see also O’Brennan & Gassie, supra 
note 3, at 81 (noting Albania’s responsible attitude to regional issues such as the 
Kosovo crisis). 
126. See Albania Profile, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-europe-17679574 (indicating that along with neighboring Kosovo, Albania has a 
Muslim majority); see also Panagiotou, supra note 54, at 61 (explaining the history 
behind Albania’s secularism and noting its role in maintaining peace among its 
Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Muslim groups). 
127. See Croatia Profile: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Jul. 24, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-europe-17217954 (presenting a chronology of key events for Croatia); see 
also Albania Profile: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Sep. 26, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-europe-17681099 (providing a chronology of key events for Albania). 
128. See Pogace, supra note 50, at 9 (recounting that SAA negotiations between 
Albania and the European Union were frozen as the Commission expressed concerns 
about Albania’s political process and its efforts in fighting corruption and organized 
crime); see also Arolda Elbasani, EU Administrative Conditionality and Domestic 
Downloading: The Limits of Europeanization in Challenging Contexts 16 (Kolleg-
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negotiations with Albania were not finalized until 2005, after the 
Albanian Parliamentary elections brought the Democratic Party 
into power.129 The SAA agreement between Albania and the 
European Union was signed on June 12, 2006.130  
The process was stalled for Albania due to the discretion 
afforded to the European Union to condition accession on the 
adoption of added political requirements. Albania did not meet 
the specific political obligations imposed by the SAA over the 
traditional Copenhagen criteria. It did not fulfill its SAA 
obligations of electoral and judiciary reform shortly after it 
signed the SAA and an agreement on visa facilitation because of 
the political parties’ lack of cooperation and constructive 
consensus.131  The political stalemate that followed the 2009 
elections led the Commission to conclude that, although a 
democracy, Albania lacked effective and stable democratic 
institutions.132 
Albania faced political challenges that affected the 
fulfillment of its SAA conditions and the Copenhagen criteria, 
namely, needed reforms to the judicial system and the fight 

Forschergruppe, Working Paper No. 2, 2009) (noting that the delay in concluding the 
SAA negotiations was due primarily to irregular elections and political instability). 
129. See O’Brennan & Gassie, supra note 3, at 65 (noting that the political 
transition brought by the 2005 elections led to the signing of the SAA between Albania 
and the European Union); see also Elbasani, supra note 127, at 16–17 (describing the 
2005 elections as an important political test for Albania in progressing with SAA 
negotiations). 
130. See O’Brennan & Gassie, supra note 3, at 65 (stating that the SAA agreement 
for Albania was signed on June 12, 2006); see also Elbasani, supra note 127, at 16 (noting 
the date that the SAA agreement was signed between Albania and the European 
Union). 
131. See Albania 2007 Progress Report, at 7, SEC (2007) 1429 (Nov. 6, 2007) 
(reporting that “the political parties’ lack of will to cooperate continued to hold back 
reforms needed to fulfill SAA obligations”); see also Enlargement Strategy Papers and Main 
Challenges 2007-2008, at 20, COM (2007) 663 final (Nov. 6, 2007) (stating that 
democratic culture and constructive dialogue between parties should be developed so 
as to make the political system function effectively and transparently). 
132. See Commission Opinion on Albania’s application for membership of the European 
Union, at 5, COM (2010) 680 (Nov. 9, 2010) (reporting that the effectiveness and 
stability of democratic institutions had not been sufficiently achieved by Albania in part 
because of the confrontational and unconstructive dialogue following the political 
stalemate of the June 2009 elections); see also Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 
2009-2010, at 22, COM (2009) 533 (Nov. 14, 2009) (noting that since the June 2009 
elections, the cultural dialogue between the political parties deteriorated which 
obstructed parliamentary work and delayed key reforms). 
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against corruption and organized crime.133 Under the human 
rights and protection of minorities obligations of the 
Copenhagen criteria, Albania needed to address domestic 
violence, ensure gender equality, prevent discrimination against 
persons with disabilities and Roma minorities, and ensure the 
independence of the media.134 Moreover, as was the case with 
Croatia, Albania must satisfy the additional regional cooperation 
condition under its SAA agreement. 135  The main political 
roadblock in fulfilling this SAA condition remains the ratified 
bilateral immunity agreement with the United States.136 This 
treaty grants exemptions from the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and does not align with 
the EU position.137 
Furthermore, Albania’s economic plight posed a significant 
challenge in its ability to meet the Copenhagen economic 
criterion. Albania emerged from the communist regime of 
repression and isolation as the poorest country in Europe.138 
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133. See Albania 2012 Progress Report, supra note 25, at 11–16 (emphasizing that 
reform of the judicial system and fight against corruption and organized crime 
continue to be key priorities that need greater reform on Albania’s part); see also 
Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 19 (listing among the key priorities that 
Albania must meet in order for accession negotiations to commence, reform to the 
judicial system and fight against corruption and organized crime). 
134. See Albania 2013 Progress Report, at 10–11, SWD (2013) 414 final (Oct. 16, 
2013) (providing the Commission’s assessment of Albania’s efforts in meeting the 
human rights and the protection of minorities aspect of the Copenhagen political 
criteria); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 33 (noting the areas in 
the field of human rights where Albania needs to make further progress). 
135. Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the 
European Partnership with Albania and Repealing Decision 2006/54/EC, Mar. 19, 2008, 
2008 O.J. L 80/1. 
136. See Albania 2012 Progress Report, supra note 25, at 23–24 (reporting on 
Albania’s constructive role in regional cooperation and the problem posed by its 
bilateral immunity agreement with the US exempting it from International Court of 
Justice’s (“ICJ”) jurisdiction); see also Albania 2013 Progress Report, supra note 137, at 
11–12 (noting that although Albania continued to play a constructive role in regional 
cooperation it needs to align itself with EU’s position regarding Albania’s bilateral 
immunity agreement with the US). 
137. See Albania 2012 Progress Report, supra note 25, at 23–24 (stating that 
Albania needs to align itself with the European Union position regarding the ICC); see 
also Albania 2013 Progress Report, supra note 134, at 11–12 (reporting that Albania has 
still to align itself with the European Union position regarding the jurisdiction of the 
ICC). 
138. See O’Brennan & Gassie, supra note 3 (noting that in the transition from 
communism, Albania continued to be plagued by problems of chronic poverty, under-
development and corruption which among other things, made it the poorest country in 
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Since then, Albania has made progress towards becoming a 
functioning market economy by maintaining macroeconomic 
stability and low inflation.139 The large public debt and budget 
deficit along with high unemployment, however, produce a 
vulnerable economy exposed to structural weaknesses 
domestically and economic volatility globally.140 Albania needs to 
address these structural weaknesses in order to cope with 
competitive pressures and market forces within the European 
Union and meet its Copenhagen economic criteria.141 
Albania continues to enhance its ability to take on the 
obligations of EU membership under the SAA and the 
Copenhagen acquis criterion by aligning its state legislation with 
the EU legislation. 142  Of the thirty-five acquis chapters 
negotiated, Albania still needs to ensure the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, reform the energy sector, reinforce 
environmental protection, and improve the fields of 
employment and social policy, free movement of workers, and 
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Europe); see also Panagiotou, supra note 54, at 358–62 (describing the lasting effects of 
the isolationist communist regime in Albania especially on the economy of the country 
making it the poorest in Europe). 
139. See European Commission, Key Findings of the 2012 Progress Report on Albania 
2, MEMO/12/763 (Oct. 10, 2012), (indicating that Albanian economy maintained 
macroeconomic and inflation stability and made progress towards becoming a 
functioning market economy); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, 
at 33 (reporting that Albania made progress towards becoming a functioning market 
economy and was able to maintain macroeconomic stability and low inflation). 
140. See European Economy, supra note 32, at 49–56 (summarizing Albania’s 
progress in meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria and highlighting some of the 
challenges that Albania continues to face); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, 
supra note 3, at 33–34 (setting forth the high budget deficit and increased public debt 
along with high unemployment as some of the short-term priorities that must be 
addressed to avoid economic vulnerability to structural weaknesses and global 
economic volatility). 
141 . See European Economy, supra note 32, at 49–56 (discussing Albania’s 
progress in meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria); see also Enlargement Strategy 
2013–2014, supra note 3, at 33–34 (noting the structural weaknesses that Albania must 
address in order to meet the Copenhagen economic criteria). 
142. See Commission’ Opinion on Albania’s Application for Membership of the European 
Union, at 8, COM (2010) 680 (Nov. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Commission’ Opinion on 
Albania’s Application] (establishing that the Commission evaluates Albania’s ability to 
assume the obligations of membership through two indicators: the obligations set out 
in the SAA and progress with the adoption, implementation, and enforcement of EU 
acquis); see also Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, at 54, COM (2012) 
600 final (Oct. 10, 2012) (assessing Albania’s progress in meeting the SAA conditions 
and the Copenhagen acquis criteria). 
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public procurement.143 The major challenge, however, remains 
the inefficient implementation and enforcement of legislation 
due to Albania’s limited administrative and judicial capacities.144 
Although Albania still must implement specific changes to meet 
the conditions imposed by the SAA and the traditional 
Copenhagen criteria, it was recommended for candidate status 
in 2013, after holding competitive and orderly parliamentary 
elections.145 
As a consequence of this recommendation, the Commission 
conditioned candidate status on five key priorities drawn from 
the SAA and Copenhagen criteria. These priorities, not imposed 
on Croatia, included the continued implementation of public 
administration reform, further efforts in reforming judicial 
institutions, determined efforts in the fight against corruption 
and organized crime, and reinforcement of human rights 
protection and anti-discrimination policies.146 Despite satisfying 
these specific obligations, imposed by virtue of the discretion 
given to the European Union under the SAP and conditionality 
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143. See Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 34 (identifying the 
acquis chapters where further efforts are needed on Albania’s part); see also 
Commission’ Opinion on Albania’s Application, supra note 141, at 8–10 (summarizing 
the Commission’s findings on the acquis chapters where Albania needs to undertake 
additional efforts). 
144. See Key Findings of the 2012 Progress Report on Albania, supra note 141, at 2 
(emphasizing that “sustained efforts are needed to strengthen administrative capacity 
for the implementation and enforcement of legislation”); see also Commission’s 
Opinion on Albania’s Application, supra note 143, at 10–12 (specifying that Albania 
needs considerable adjustments of the legal and institutional framework and significant 
strengthening of administrative and implementation capacities). 
145. See Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 18–19 (stating that the 
elections of June 2013 were assessed as competitive and genuinely respective of 
fundamental freedoms and the Commission recommended that Albania be granted 
candidate status); see also Christina Vasilaki, Albania Progress Sufficient for Candidate 
Status, Says the EC, NEW EUR. ONLINE (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.neurope.eu/article/
albania-progress-sufficient-candidate-status-says-ec (noting that Albania finally received 
a positive recommendation for candidate status from the Commission after the orderly 
June parliamentary elections). 
146. See Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 20 (listing the key 
priorities that Albania must satisfy before accession negotiations begin); see also Arta 
Tozaj, European Commission Recommends Status for Albania, TOP CHANNEL, Oct. 16, 2013, 
http://www.top-channel.tv/english/artikull.php?id=10170 (reporting that according to 
the Commission, for Albania to open accession talks, it must fulfill five remaining 
conditions). 
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principle, the Council did not grant Albania candidate status.147 
Many viewed this as the European Union turning a cold 
shoulder to Albania, ultimately undermining the credibility of 
the accession process. 148  Member States that voted against 
Albania’s candidate status, on the other hand, argued that the 
postponement was justified by the need for a longer history of 
progress in meeting obligations, a record that was not required 
for Croatia.149 
Fellow Western Balkan country and EU member Croatia 
supported the step forward for Albania, criticizing the slow 
accession process.150 Croatia, which itself had a smooth accession 
process despite having to satisfy obligations under its SAA, noted 
that the imposition of conditional obligations appeared to be 
more burdensome and significant for Albania than those 
conditions imposed on Croatia.151 Although Albania offered the 
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147. See Kate Holman, Albania Deserves EU Candidate Status, EUOBSERVER, Dec. 16, 
2013, http://euobserver.com/opinion/122466 (noting that despite Füle’s warnings, 
Albania was not granted candidate status even though it satisfied its obligations); see also 
Status Postponed to June, TOP CHANNEL (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.top-channel.tv/
english/artikull.php?id=10641 (reporting that the European Council postponed 
granting Albania candidate status). 
148. See Holman, supra note 147 (noting Albania got the European Union cold 
shoulder again even though it deserved candidate status); see also Status Postponed to 
June, supra note 147 (reporting that Albania’s candidate status was vetoed by Germany, 
France, Great Britain, Netherlands, and Denmark). 
149. See Serbia Expected to Get EU Membership Boost; Delay for Albania, LONDON 
SOUTH EAST (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.lse.co.uk/AllNews.asp?code=hom3d2xj 
(reporting that the Netherlands explained its position regarding Albania as based on 
the need for a longer track record of reform); see also David Cameron Backs EU 
Enlargement, But Wants Tougher Immigration Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 20, 2013), 
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/12/20/european-union-david-
cameron-immigration_n_4478432.html (noting that the United Kingdom favors 
postponing talks with Albania for six months to “enable the country to start initial 
reforms to make the country more compatible with its possible future union 
partners”). 
150. See Serbia Expected to Get EU Membership Boost; Delay for Albania, supra note 149 
(reporting that Croatia supports Albania’s progress and has called for Albania to be 
granted candidate status); see also Arta Tozaj, Dilemma for Albania’s Status, TOP CHANNEL 
(Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.top-channel.tv/english/artikull.php?id=10636 (stating 
that Croatia initiated the letter for candidate status recommendations for Albania). 
151. See Peter Tase, Eight EU Foreign Ministers Support Albania’s Candidacy, EURASIA 
REVIEW NEWS & ANALYSIS (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.eurasiareview.com/15122013-
eight-eu-foreign-ministers-support-albanias-candidacy-oped/ (pointing out the 
conditions imposed by the Commission on Albania); see also Serbia Expected to Get EU 
Membership Boost; Delay for Albania, supra note 149 (stating that according to Croatia, 
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same type of promise and ability for reform to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria as Croatia, it was subject to a longer 
accession process because of the Commission’s ability to 
condition progress on meeting country-specific obligations.152 
III. THE MAGIC WAND: AN EVALUATION OF THE ACCESSION 
PROCESS 
Part III engages in an in-depth analysis of European 
Union’s current accession mechanisms and the present and 
future effects those mechanisms have on candidate countries. 
Part III.A evaluates the Copenhagen criteria and the policy of 
conditionality as the two accession mechanisms employed in 
assessing a candidate country for accession to the European 
Union. Part III.B analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of the 
accession mechanisms as applied and the impact they have on 
the stability of a candidate country. Part III concludes that the 
current accession mechanisms of conditionality and the 
Copenhagen criteria are especially problematic when applied to 
the Western Balkan countries and must be reconsidered if the 
European Union’s policy of enlargement is to effectively expand 
to the Western Balkan region. 
A. An Evaluation of Current Accession Mechanisms: Conditionality 
and the Copenhagen Criteria 
Legal commentators have highlighted two variables that 
affect the accession criteria and produce drawbacks to the 
European Union’s regional approach to accession for Western 
Balkan states—the asymmetrical relationship between the 
European Union and candidate countries and the built-in 
uncertainty of the accession process.153 This creates a system that 

Albania has done everything necessary in accordance with the accession criteria to be 
granted candidate status). 
152. See Tase, supra note 151 (highlighting all areas where Albania has made 
progress to meet the accession criteria and the additional conditions imposed by the 
Commission); see also Serbia Expected to Get EU Membership Boost; Delay for Albania, supra 
note 149 (noting that the conditions imposed on Albania are used by the European 
Union to justify the fact that there are things that remain to be done). 
153. See Grabbe, supra note 51, at 303 (arguing that the uncertainty in the criteria 
and the asymmetry of power between the applicant country and the European Union 
gives the European Union greater influence through the additional criteria); 
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is ripe for exploitation, as the Commission is given wide latitude 
to impose country-specific obligations without regard to 
consistency in application of this process. 154  That said, any 
imbalance of power might be negligible, as evidence shows that 
candidate countries are not affected by this perception of the 
European Union power.155 Additionally, commentators explain 
that the uncertainty of the accession process is created by the 
inconsistent application of the accession criteria and the 
imposition of conditional obligations under country-specific 
SAAs. This results in different considerations and requirements 
for different candidate countries.156 
B. Power Differentials and Asymmetrical Relationships 
One notable criticism of the regional approach to the 
accession process for Western Balkan countries is the power 
imbalance between the European Union and candidate 
countries. 157  Scholars argue that there is an asymmetrical 

Kochenov, supra note 22, at 23 (asserting that “the enlargement process suffered from 
the ambiguity of meaning and vagueness of the Copenhagen criteria”); see also Pogace, 
supra note 50, at 10 (acknowledging the argument that the Copenhagen criteria cannot 
serve as benchmarks during the integration process of candidate countries because 
they are vague and incomprehensible). 
154 . See Atanasova, supra note 51, at 6–7 (explaining how the asymmetric 
relationship between the European Union and the applicant countries is created); see 
also Grabbe, supra note 51, at 316 (arguing that the relationship between the European 
Union and the candidate countries is one of “obvious asymmetry of interdependence, 
and hence power”). 
155. See Gergana Noutcheva, Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the 
EU’s Normative Power in the Western Balkans 2 (Ctr. for Eur. Pol’y Stud., Working Paper 
No. 274, 2007) (arguing that the European Union’s policy in Western Balkans “lacks a 
strong normative justification, which affects the degree of compliance with EU’s 
demands” especially for sovereignty-related issues); Freyburg & Richter, supra note 75, 
at 2 (analyzing Croatia to show that national identity significantly affects compliance 
with EU conditions leading to inconsistent compliance with the accession criteria); see 
also Noutcheva, supra note 72 (proposing that sovereignty is a critical intervening 
variable which affects compliance with EU conditionality leading either partial, non-
compliance or temporary compliance vulnerable to reversal). 
156. See Kochenov, supra note 22, at 4 (providing Greece as an example of the 
inconsistent application of the Copenhagen criteria and conditionality where the 
Council disregarded the unfavorable economic assessment of Greece’s membership 
application); supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text (discussing the criticism of the 
Copenhagen criteria as vague and problematic because of its inconsistent application). 
157. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text (setting forth the criticism 
that the Copenhagen criteria and conditionality lead to a power imbalance between the 
European Union and candidate countries). 
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relationship between the European Union and a candidate 
country that undermines the regional approach since the 
European Union creates the accession rules and controls 
conditionality without input from the candidate or oversight.158 
The fairy godmother casts the spell and the poor girl must 
conform to and be satisfied with the transformation she receives. 
The Commission enjoys an autocratic role and is the only body 
empowered to subjectively define, evaluate, and enforce the 
accession criteria.159 Taking this power imbalance into account, 
it is unclear how much weight the candidate countries assign to 
the Commission’s conditions and requirements, or how effective 
those requirements are in prompting reform. For example, 
while Croatia complied with the Commission’s requirement to 
cooperate with the ICTY, Albania was required but did not feel 
pressured to withdraw from its bilateral immunity agreement on 
the ICC with the United States irrespective of the consequences 
it would have on its accession progress.160 The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (“FYRM”) provides another example. 
Despite being the first country to sign an SAA and gain 
candidate status in 2005, FYRM has yet to open accession 
negotiations because it continually rejects the conditional 
obligation to reach a mutually acceptable resolution to issues 
with Greece over its name.161 
While the power imbalance may not force applicant 
countries into accepting conditions and obligations, the 
imbalance does significantly affect the progress of accession 

158 . See Atanasova, supra note 51, at 6–7 (explaining how the asymmetric 
relationship between the European Union and the applicant countries is created); see 
also Grabbe, supra note 51, at 316 (arguing that the relationship between the European 
Union and the candidate countries is one of “obvious asymmetry of interdependence, 
and hence power”). 
159 . See supra notes 61–66 and accompanying text (describing part of the 
Commission’s role in the accession process, especially its power to evaluate candidate 
countries based on criteria set out by the Commission in the progress report). 
160 . See supra notes 95–97, 106, 138–39 and accompanying text (discussing 
Croatia’s eventual compliance with the ICTY and Albania’s persistence in maintaining 
the bilateral agreement with the United States). 
161. See Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012–2013, supra note 142, at 13 
(providing a timeline of Macedonia’s accession process and noting its failure to resolve 
the name issue with Greece); see also Key Findings of the 2013 Progress Report on the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, MEMO13/890 (Oct. 16, 2013) (presenting the key dates 
in Macedonia’s accession process and emphasizing the need for a resolution regarding 
the name issue with Greece in order for accession negotiations to open). 
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negotiations.162 The Commission’s reports on the Copenhagen 
criteria and the imposition of conditional obligations indicate 
that conditionality has teeth and can be used to abruptly end 
accession negotiations.163 This was especially true in the case of 
Croatia when the European Union froze accession negotiations 
to force compliance with the ICTY.164 Yet, the European Union 
has not taken such forceful measures to ensure compliance by 
Albania and Macedonia, which suggests an inconsistent 
application of the principle of conditionality with serious 
measures taken only for those countries that the European 
Union wants to accede quickly.165 
The greatest flaw of the accession process and the accession 
process in general, however, is the lack of deadlines for each 
condition imposed by the Commission. It is here that the power 
imbalance becomes more apparent, as the Commission has 
ample discretion to prolong the accession process whereas a 
candidate country can do little to affect its timeframe.166 After 
all, the spell from the fairy godmother is broken at midnight. 
This is particularly apparent in the postponement of Albania’s 
candidate status.167 The message sent by the postponement in 
light of Albania’s compliance with the key reforms was not 
“Albania did not earn candidate status” but “The European 
Union is not ready or willing to grant Albania candidate status.” 
The Enlargement Commissioner saw the decision as a blow to 
Albania’s efforts in pursuing the far-reaching reforms and to the 
credibility of the EU accession process itself.168 Albania’s case 
provides an example of the great leverage the European Union 
has in managing a candidate country’s progress towards 

162. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
164 . See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying texts (describing the 
Commission’s decision to put a stop to the accession process in order to compel 
Croatia to cooperate with the ICTY). 
165. See supra notes 135–36, 160 and accompanying text (describing Albania’s 
decision to maintain its bilateral treaty with the US and Macedonia’s unresolved name 
issue with Greece despite the Committees conditionality). 
166. See supra Part I.B (discussing the accession process for Western Balkan 
countries). 
167. See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text (discussing the postponement 
of Albania’s candidate status). 
168. See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text (discussing the postponement 
of Albania’s candidate status). 
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accession in the absence of mandatory timeframes for specific 
conditions. 
Croatia provides another example of the European Union’s 
ability to control the accession timeframe in cases where 
favoritism is coupled with strong political and administrative 
pressures. The Commission adjusted Croatia’s Progress Reports 
to justify granting Romania membership before Croatia despite 
Croatia’s greater progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen 
criteria.169 In Croatia’s case, the Commission also modified the 
criteria to include regional cooperation and cooperation with 
the ICTY despite the fact that only the original Copenhagen 
criteria is legally binding for EU membership.170 
C. Copenhagen Criteria or Conditionality: Which is Most Important? 
The crux of the criticism of the Copenhagen criteria 
centers on its inherent vagueness.171 The Commission is left with 
the discretion to evaluate and apply the Copenhagen criteria 
and conditional obligations under the SAP, thus leading to 
inconsistent considerations for each candidate country.172 The 
resulting uncertainty stems from the overbroad criteria 
purposely built into the accession process.173 In this fairytale of 
accession, who other than the fairy godmother would 
understand the spell? 

169. See Viljar Veebel, Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, 
Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation, 3 STUD. TRANSITIONAL ST. & 
SOCIETIES 3, 18–19 (2011) (comparing Croatia’s performance on accession criteria to 
Romania’s performance based on objective qualitative measures and the Commission’s 
assessment and concluding that despite Croatia’s better performance, the Commission 
adjusted the progress report to justify political preferences and necessities); see also 
Milada A. Vachudova & Aneta Spendzharova, The EU’s Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism: Fighting Corruption in Bulgaria and Romania After EU Accession, 2012 EUR. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 13 (2012) (noting that Croatia outperformed Bulgaria and Romania 
in a number of accession criteria). 
170. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing the additional regional 
cooperation and cooperation with the ICTY requirements for Croatia). 
171. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the criticism of the 
Copenhagen criteria as vague). 
172. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the criticism of the 
Copenhagen criteria as vague). 
173. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text (noting that uncertainty and 
asymmetric relationship that develops as a result of the Copenhagen criteria’s 
vagueness). 
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While criticism of the inconsistency is not without merit, 
reports indicate that the Commission has developed a more 
technical system of conditions with measurable criteria and 
assessment through years of application.174 This, in turn, gives 
the Commission leeway in assessing and assigning conditions for 
Western Balkan countries where the political, economic, and 
judicial maturity and stability are uncertain.175 The transparency 
and impartiality objectives of the process would be better served, 
however, if more quantifiable guidelines replaced the broad 
criteria currently in place.176  
The prolonged accession process in Western Balkan 
countries is the result of these additional, non-quantitative 
criteria that lack fixed deadlines and are subject to the 
Commission’s subjective assessment.177 As a consequence, it is 
the intentional decision to establish broad accession criteria that 
provides the Commission with control over the speed and cost 
of the accession process while progress-based accession takes the 
back seat.178 Thus the question arises: what is the primary factor 
guiding the Commission’s assessment of a candidate country’s 
progress, compliance with conditionality or the Copenhagen 
criteria? Or, is it something else altogether? 
The question stems in part from the fact that the system is 
largely a compromise between the interests of individual EU 
Member States. 179  While the European Union’s desire to 
safeguard against any spillover of political, economic, or legal 
problems arising from a speedy accession is understandable, 

174. See, e.g., Albania 2007 Progress Report, supra note 133; Albania 2012 Progress 
Report, supra note 25; Croatia 2005 Progress Report, supra note 114; Croatia 2011 Progress 
Report, supra note 28 (providing examples of the Commission’s progress reports and 
the criteria and conditions contained therein at different time periods). 
175. See, e.g., Albania 2007 Progress Report, supra note 133; Albania 2012 Progress 
Report, supra note 25; Croatia 2005 Progress Report, supra note 114; Croatia 2011 Progress 
Report, supra note 28 (providing examples of the Commission’s progress reports and 
the criteria and conditions contained therein at different time periods). 
176 . See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting that objectivity and 
impartiality are the main objectives of the Copenhagen criteria and conditionality). 
177. See supra notes 170–75 and accompanying text. 
178. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text. 
179. See Veebel, supra note 169, at 9 (spelling out the different motivations and 
interests guiding EU Member States in deciding the accession criteria); see also Grabbe, 
supra note 51, at 15–16 (indicating that each EU Member State is guided by their own 
interests therefore a candidate country faces uncertainty about whom to satisfy). 
2014] FROM RAGS TO RICHES 1727 
how much power can a single EU Member State exert over the 
process in order to protect its own interests?180  
The uncertainty over what part of the accession criteria 
controls, coupled with the indication that the subjective 
conditions imposed on candidate countries can be manipulated 
by Member States with grievances against an applicant country, 
impedes the accession process and creates opportunity for 
exploitation. The fact that an EU Member can bring the whole 
process to a standstill, therefore, presents a problem that is 
difficult to sidestep. 
D. Failure to Reform: Present and Future Effects of Current Accession 
Mechanisms 
The mechanisms that frame the accession process, namely 
conditionality and the Copenhagen criteria, serve as a platform 
for EU Member States to discriminate against Western Balkan 
countries. This discrimination is realized through the imposition 
of additional and burdensome conditions and is made apparent 
by the disillusionment suffered by candidate countries as they 
attempt to avoid a drawn-out process without actually 
implementing the necessary reforms. 
The European Union’s regional approach to Western 
Balkan accession can be best characterized as one of integration 
through discrimination. The European Union’s goodwill 
towards the Western Balkans is called into question as Western 
Balkan countries are forced to resolve their issues prior to 
gaining any prospective of membership. Paired with concern 
over enlargement fatigue, 181  the process feeds into existing 
stereotypes and perpetuates a cycle whereby the Western Balkan 
countries cannot shed the label of Europe’s “black hole.”182 The 
European Union, therefore, appears to hold these countries at 
arm’s length, dangling the prospect of membership while 
imposing a multitude of country-specific conditions that slow 
this process, sometimes to a complete halt. 

180 . See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying notes (discussing Slovenia’s 
blockade of Croatia’s accession negotiations). 
181. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the fear that following 
Croatia’s accession, the European Union is suffering from enlargement fatigue). 
182. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the image that has 
developed of the Western Balkan countries as Europe’s black hole). 
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Not surprisingly, research shows that as a candidate’s 
country moves closer to accession, the popular support for EU 
membership dwindles. In Croatia, public support dropped to 
about sixty-six percent prior to EU membership, while in 
Albania, public support for EU accession remained high.183 Yet, 
the recent postponement of Albania’s candidate status calls this 
assertion into question as the Albanian government has soured 
on the process but is willing to go forward with the reforms.184 In 
his national address on December 18, 2013, the Albanian Prime 
Minister clearly showed that the conditions imposed in the 
drawn-out accession process can create disillusionment in the 
applicant country. 185  He noted the resistance within the 
European Union towards further enlargement and cited the EU 
economic crisis, unemployment, and immigration as real factors 
that affected the rejection.186 In this regard, Albania resembles 
the poor girl in the fairytale who realizes that the magic wears 
off after a short while and is faced with the reality of returning to 
a similar life when the spell breaks. 
Once the supervised accession process trespasses on the 
Western Balkan countries’ sovereignties, therefore, the 
European Union cannot make a half-willed effort to push for 
reform but must employ the power imbalance to effect change. 
The Copenhagen criteria alone create a clear promise of 

183. See Jovic, supra note 7, at 201–02 (presenting percentages for the fluctuation 
in public opinion in favor of EU membership in Croatia culminating in the sixty-six 
percent in favor of it during the referendum); see also Executive Summary, in THE 
WESTERN BALKANS AND THE EU: ‘THE HOUR OF EUROPE’, supra note 72, at 7, 10 (noting 
that the popular support for EU accession is strongest in Albania where it is least 
advanced and weakest in Croatia where it is most advanced). 
184. See Rama: Verdict Makes Us More Determined, TOP CHANNEL (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://www.top-channel.tv/english/artikull.php?id=10653&ref=fp (reporting on Prime 
Minister Edi Rama’s response to EU’s postponement of Albania’s candidate status); see 
also Statusi, Rama: Vendimi I BE, Rrit Vendosmerine Tone Per Reforma Te Thella, 
BALKANWEB, http://www.balkanweb.com/bw_lajme2.php?IDNotizia=164018&
IDCategoria=2685 [hereinafter Statusi] (noting the Prime Minister’s reaction to the 
rejection of Albania’s candidate status). 
185. See Rama: Verdict Makes Us More Determined, supra note 184 (providing a 
summary of the Albanian Prime Minister’s speech); see also Statusi, supra note 184 
(noting Albania’s response to the European Union’s decision to delay granting Albania 
candidate status). 
186 . See Rama: Verdict Makes Us More Determined, supra note 184 (reporting 
Albania’s response to EU’s postponement of candidate status); see also Statusi, supra 
note 184 (discussing the Albanian Prime Minister’s response to Albania being delayed 
candidate status). 
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accession because these elements are concrete, irrespective of 
whether ultimate membership is a distant prospect with no 
guarantees. The uncertainty inherent in the current accession 
process, however, creates a risk that the Western Balkan 
countries will lose their motivation, drive, and willingness to 
work towards membership. Despite the benefits that the 
accession process itself may bring, a drawn out process could 
lead to partial or faked compliance especially for sovereignty-
related issues.187 The result is one that the European Union is 
familiar with: the candidate country will not complete the 
required reforms and will continue to present problems once it 
becomes a Member State.188  
CONCLUSION 
The drawbacks of the accession mechanisms employed by 
the European Union become even more apparent in their 
application to the Western Balkan countries. The asymmetrical 
relationship between the European Union and candidate 
countries and the uncertain weight assigned to conditionality 
and the Copenhagen criteria raise important questions about 
the effectiveness and future of the European Union accession 
process. Salvaging the European Union enlargement policy may 
require more than a re-evaluation of the accession process, it 
may require actual reform. 
The focus must also shift to the candidate countries and 
their efforts to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria and the 
benchmarks set for EU membership. Once the European Union 
has infringed upon their sovereignty the push for reform must 
be more vigorous. The promise of membership must be clear 
and continuously reinforced and each benchmark should 
contain reasonable timeframes for compliance that take into 

187 . See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing partial or non-
compliance with accession criteria and conditionality by candidate countries for 
sovereignty-related issues). 
188. See Vachudova & Spendzharova, supra note 169, at 1 (explaining that post EU 
accession, corruption remains a substantial and unyielding problem for Bulgaria and 
Romania); see also Christos T. Panagopoulos, Unemployment remains a major problem for 
Croatia, INDEPENDENT BALKAN NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 19, 2013), http://
www.balkaneu.com/unemployment-remains-major-problem-croatia/ (reporting a rise 
in unemployment rate in Croatia). 
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account the realities of each candidate country. It is time for the 
European Union to re-evaluate their accession process and 
uphold the same principles they demand of candidate countries: 
decentralization, accountability, and transparency. 
 
